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I. Introduction
"Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and indus-
trial disease. Sunlight is said to be the best disinfectant; electric
light the most efficient policeman."'
"The human and economic wreckage from the manipulative corpo-
rate raids of the '80s [makes it] hard to fathom why the Commis-
sion would allow big, powerful investors the right to line up votes
for a proxy contest, including a contest for control of a company's
1. Louis BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How TH BANKcRs USE IT 92
(1914).
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board, without some kind of public disclosure to the other
shareholders." 2
The participation of institutional investors3 in the corpo-
rate governance process has generated an enormous amount of
debate among scholars, politicians, and regulators.4 Propo-
nents of institutional investor activism in the United States
often cite the Japanese, 5 German,6 and British 7 systems as hall-
2. H. Brewster Atwater, Co-chairman, Business Roundtable Corporate Task
Force, quoted in Secret Communications Loophole Attacked by Business Round-
table, PR NEWSWIRE ASSOCIATION, INC., Oct. 16, 1992, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Arcnws File.
3. The New York Stock Exchange defines an institution as an organization
that "manage[s] the combined assets of many investors, both large and small."
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, FACT BOOK FOR THE YEAR 1991 3 (1992). This defini-
tion encompasses public pension funds, corporate pension funds, union pension
funds, retail mutual funds, banks, insurance companies, annuity companies, pri-
vate foundations, and educational and other philanthropic institutions. Id.
4. In 1992, The President's Competitiveness Policy Council announced plans
to study how corporate governance issues in the financial markets affect U.S. com-
panies' competitiveness. It set one objective to "create an environment of economic
and policy stability within which managers can do what many of them already
want to do-manage the corporation for long-term growth." COMPETITIVENESS
POLICY COUNCIL, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT & CONGRESS: BUILDING
A CoMPETITIvE AMERICA 24 (Mar. 1, 1992). A Corporate Governance subcouncil
will be chaired by Ed Regan, former Comptroller of the State of New York, the
author of extensive recommendations to both the 1991 and 1992 rule proposals by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC" or the "Commission"). One of
Mr. Regan's proposals was submitted by the SEC for comment in the 1992 proxy
reproposal. See infra note 117 and accompanying text. A main reason for the new
interest in institutional investors and their relation to corporate governance is the
rapid growth in holdings by institutional investors. From 1950 to 1980, the level of
equities owned by institutional investors rose from 8% to 33% and then increased
to 53% in 1991. John C. Coffee, Jr., Comparative Corporate Governance, N.Y. L.J.,
Mar. 26, 1992, at 5. Today, a Fortune 100 corporation can be 70-80% owned by a
few institutional investors. Id. See, e.g., Bevis Longstreth, Reflections on the State
of Corporate Governance, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 113, 113 (1991) (relating that "[t]o
judge from the wealth of recent writings and symposia on the subject, corporate
governance, and in particular, the role of the institutional investor therein, has
become the new 'hot' topic among academics (Richard M. Buxbaum, Ronald J. Gil-
son, Reinier Kraakman, Louis Lowenstein, George W. Dent, Jr.), lawyers (Martin
Lipton, Steven A. Rosenblum and A.A. Sommer, Jr.), businessmen (Elmer John-
son) and institutional investors (CalPERS))." CalPERS is the abbreviation for Cal-
ifornia State Public Employee's Retirement System.
5. Coffee, supra note 4, at 7. The major Japanese institution that takes an
active role in corporate governance is the Keiretsu. The Keiretsu is a network of
companies organized around a "main bank" that finances the investments among
member companies at rates and conditions well below what the market would nor-
mally dictate. Id. at 6. Accordingly, the Keiretsu bank "holds both equity and debt
investments in each member" and each member owns a significant proportion of
3
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the shares in the main bank. Id. Moreover, each of the companies within the
Keiretsu owns a "permanent" investment in all the other Keiretsu companies,
averaging approximately .5 to 3%. Id. The unique structure of the Keiretsu allows
its members to simultaneously be "shareholder, creditor, supplier, customer, and
debtor." Id. It is the combination of reciprocity and cross ownership that fuels the
Keiretsu's success. Id.
In addition to the reduced costs of capital resulting from bank financing, each
member has a steady demand for its goods since business among the group is con-
ducted in a mutually reinforcing manner, and each utilizes other member compa-
nies as its principal supplier. Coffee, supra note 4, at 6. For example, the Keiretsu
bank lends to individual Keiretsu corporations. Each corporation, in turn, supplies
goods and services to all other Keiretsu members. Id. This results in what one
commentator has described as an evolution of "complex relationships" whose terms
are "based on norms of reciprocity and implicit contracting." Id.
6. Jayne W. Barnard, Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Govern-
ance, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1135, 1146-47 (1991). According to one commentator, only
banks and insurance companies are important to the German market, as opposed
to the variety of institutional investors present in the United States. Friedreich K
Kubler, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A German Dilemma, 57
BRooK. L. REV. 97, 99 (1991). German public companies are governed by a two tier
board of directors, the Vorstand and the Aufsichtsrat. Barnard, supra at 1147.
The Vorstand, the management board, manages the company, creates company
policy, and is held accountable for company success or failure. Id. The Aufsicht-
srat, the supervisory board, supervises the Vorstand by selecting the Vorstand's
members and "approv[ing] the yearly balance sheet and profit statement." Id. The
Aufsichtsrat traditionally consists of "bankers, businessmen or representatives of
the public." Id. (quoting JEREMY C. BACON & JAMES L. BROWN, THE BOARD OF Di-
RECTORS: PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES IN NINE COUNTRIES 28 (1977)); see also Cof-
fee, supra note 4, at 6 (noting that banks hold 34% of the "voting power in the
[largest] 100 German corporations and more than 50 percent of the 10 largest
firms"). Banks wield a considerable amount of power in the Aufsichtsrat and,
hence, in corporate governance for two reasons. First, banks control a large
number of votes because "they often serve as trustees or assignees of publicly
owned shares.. .. " Barnard, supra at 1147. Second, the German securities mar-
ket lists less than 500 "publicly-traded German companies," and German banks
own a large percentage of the available shares or lend capital directly to the corpo-
rations. Id. at 1147-48.
Due to the creditor-debtor relationship between the banks and German corpo-
rations, the banks are uniquely informed and have developed a great "expertise."
Id. at 1148. German institutional influence has focused on long-term gain and has
been characterized as "aggressive, comparative, and informed." Id. As a result,
shareholder wealth has been "maximiz[ed] and German corporations are interna-
tionally very competitive." Id. Other commentators point out that equity capital is
less expensive in Germany because "bank monitoring reduces risk." Coffee, supra
note 4, at 7.
7. Coffee, supra note 4, at 7. In Great Britain, institutional investors are a
significant force in the market. Id. at 7. The British exchange is "deep and liquid,"
and is "much more developed than any other European stock exchange" with a
"much larger public float than the Tokyo stock exchange." Id.
As of 1985, institutional investors owned 60% of all equities in the British
market. Paul L. Davies, Institutional Investors: A U.K. View, 57 BROOK. L. REV.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol14/iss2/3
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mark examples where large institutions have actively and suc-
cessfully participated in corporate governance.8 Institutions in
129, 131 (1991) (citing Cosh et al., Institutional Investment, Mergers and the Mar-
ket for Corporate Control, 1 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 73, 77 (1989)). Of these institu-
tional investors, pension funds and insurance companies hold a prominent portion
of the equities, about 54.2% and about 32.9%, respectively. Id. This commentator
noted that "[elquity investment directly by individuals is a relatively shallow activ-
ity." Id.
The main distinction between the United States and British situations is that
the British market does not have a body which oversees shareholder voting proce-
dure and, thus, institutional investors are unregulated. The large English institu-
tions, pension funds, insurance companies, unit trusts, and investment companies,
have formed independent associations, "umbrella institutions," which spread the
institutional monitoring costs. Coffee, supra note 4, at 7. However, even with this
system and environment, British institutions have not been very active. Id.
8. Panelists at the Securities and Exchange Commission's Forum on Corpo-
rate Governance and American Competitiveness noted that "a fundamental re-
structuring" of the SEC's rules and regulations would allow American institutional
investors to monitor American management in a manner similar to Japanese and
German institutions. Coffee, supra note 4, at 5.
These three systems have all been criticized for various inadequacies. The
Japanese system has been criticized because only about 25% or less of the equity of
Keiretsu companies is available to the public and, hence, the minority shareholder
is exposed for abuse. Id. at 6. Such shareholders are "clearly exposed to sub-nor-
mal returns, because the stockholding members of the Keiretsu can exact their
principal return through their non-shareholder relationships to the corporation."
Id. A "weak level of monitoring" and "shareholder expos[ure] to below market re-
turns" are characteristic of the Keiretsu. Id. The Keiretsu is a system of indus-
trial organization, not shareholder protection, and will only address shareholder
problems after "insolvency or scandal." Id. Recently, as indicated by the decline in
the NIKKEI Dow, the Japanese stock exchange index, minority shareholders have
been hurt by the "conflicts of interest inherent in the Keiretsu system." Id. Even
the insurance companies, normally considered "illiquid" investors, have
threatened the Keiretsu with disinvestment due to low dividends. Coffee, supra
note 4, at 6.
The German system has also been criticized as producing an extremely under-
developed securities market where approximately 100 companies lack a "control-
ling shareholder or group." Id. at 6. Furthermore, one commentator has stated:
In Germany, . . . financial markets are shaped by more permanent social
relations between enterprises and workers, between corporations and man-
agement and between banks and manufacturing industry. This appears to
indicate a different rhythm, perhaps more in line with other segments of
society. Business is slower and steadier; there is less mobility, less growth
and less color and excitement. Germany has no Michael Milken and no Don-
ald Trump. But there is also more continuity and somewhat less risk.
Kubler, supra note 6, at 110-11. Criticism of the British system resembles the
criticisms of the American regulatory environment under the new proxy regula-
tions made by the authors in this paper. See infra notes 289-329 and accompany-
ing text. Problematic areas specifically include the lack of accountability of large
pension plans that invest their assets in the equity markets. Davies, supra note 7,
5
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these foreign countries not only monitor and replace manage-
ment in corporations that occupy the institutions' "portfolios,"
but they also engineer market conditions through their control
of corporations' access to debt and equity capital.9
Institutional investors in the United States do not individu-
ally own large enough equity interests in corporations to wield
the influence necessary to effectuate centralized economic plan-
ning.'0 Institutional investors acting in concert, however, often
do wield sufficient voting power to effectuate corporate change
and influence corporate decisions.1' In the aggregate, institu-
tional investors own $6.5 trillion in assets which represents
more than one-fifth of all United States assets.12
One way for such investors to pool their resources is by en-
tering into shareholder agreements with each other to vote
their shares together by proxy. 13 Historically, federal securities
regulation posed significant hurdles to such shareholder cooper-
ation for both the institutional and individual investor. Under
the old rules, proxy disclosure was required for most share-
at 142-43. But see generally Coffee, supra note 4, at 7 (concluding that the success
of the British model poses a positive model for institutional activism in the United
States).
9. Coffee, supra note 4, at 6.
10. Institutions commonly hold about 2-3% of the stock of a single company.
Some even hold over 5%, which requires them to file a Schedule 13D or Schedule
13G. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520,
568 (1990). Even the largest of the institutional investors hold only small portions
of individual companies. One commentator has stated that in order to "take effec-
tive legal action any institutional shareholder must rely upon support of other in-
stitutional and individual shareholder." A.A. Sommer, Jr., Corporate Governance
in the Nineties: Management vs. Institutions, 59 U. CiNN. L. REv. 357, 367 (1990).
11. See John Pound, Beyond Takeovers: Politics Comes of Corporate Control,
HARv. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 83, 87 (noting that "a heavy concentration of
institutional investors greatly lowers the costs of presenting an alternative
agenda").
12. John M. Conley & William M. O'Barr, The Culture of Capital: An Anthro-
pological Investigation of Institutional Investment, 70 N.C. L. REV. 823, 823 (1992).
Other commentators have noted that institutional investors own 53% of all United
States equities. Coffee, supra note 4, at 5. One scholar estimated in 1987 that
pension funds owned 50% of the common stock of the Standard and Poor's 500 (the
S & P 500) corporations. Sommer, supra note 10, at 361.
13. A proxy is a written authorization given by one person to another to repre-
sent that person and vote his shares at the shareholder meeting. See infra part
III.
464
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holder communications. 14 Compliance with these rules was
costly and, hence, had a chilling effect on institutional investor
activism.15 In addition, the regulatory barriers presented by
section 13(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ("Ex-
change Act") provide some deterrence to large scale cooperation
among shareholders, who fearful of forming a group for 13(d)
purposes and retroactively being determined to have triggered
13(d), do not communicate. 16 This barrier still remains, but
some have called for leniency in its enforcement, or its rescis-
sion, and many new institutional strategies have completely
avoided detection by the SEC or have evaded the legal bounda-
ries of section 13(d).
The demise of junk bonds, the increase in state regula-
tion,17 and the resultant disappearance of the corporate raider 8
14. See ROBERT A. G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY
260-61 (1991); see also Black, supra note 10, at 524-25, 535-42 (1990); Coffee,
supra note 4, at 5; Ronald J. Gibson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REv. 863, 894-96
(1992).
15. Black, supra note 10, at 536-37, 564-65. A senior official in CalPERS
stated in regard to the proxy situation: "[Olver the last six years, CalPERS, has
introduced over 40 shareholder proposals on a variety of corporate governance
matters... the process has been arduous, confusing, expensive and generally dis-
appointing to us." Letter from James Mosman, Chief Executive Officer of the Cali-
fornia State Teachers' Retirement System, to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (July 31, 1992) (on file with author).
16. See infra notes 337-54 and accompanying text.
17. States have raised significant opposition to corporate acquisition in the
last several years. The most significant regulatory hurdles are the takeover stat-
utes. By 1990, 42 states had enacted some form of takeover statute. 5 Louis Loss
& JOEL SELIGMAN, SEcurITIEs REGULATION 2264 (3d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1993). The
most significant is the Delaware Business Combination Statute, DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 203 (1992), since "over 40% of the companies listed on the New York Stock
Exchange [NYSE] are incorporated in Delaware." Leo Harzel & Laura Richman,
Delaware's Preeminence by Design, in 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKEL-
STEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, F-1 (2d ed.
1990 & Supp. 1991) (citing N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) N725-802). The Delaware stat-
ute bars a business combination between Delaware corporations and interested
shareholders for three years after the shareholder becomes interested unless 1) the
board of directors approves the merger; 2) two-thirds of the uninterested share-
holders approve the merger; 3) the interested shareholder owns at least 85% of the
stock; or 4) the corporation had opted out of the statute. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 203 (1992).
Another recent legislative measure which has increased the difficulty of con-
summating hostile takeovers is the passage of statutes by state governments
which permit boards of directors to act in the interests of diverse constituencies.
By 1990, 29 states had enacted such statutes. Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosen-
7
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have substantially changed the means for effecting corporate
control. 19 These changes, coupled with the emergence of the in-
stitutional investor and recent economic malaise, have sub-
jected the federal proxy regulations, one of the few remaining
venues for effecting corporate management, to intense scrutiny.
In response to voiced investor dissatisfaction, 20 on October
15, 1992, the SEC approved a package of "reforms" that, inter
alia, significantly relaxed proxy filing requirements for share-
blum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Direc-
tors, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 187, 214-15 (1991). These statutes grant directors wide
discretion by explicitly requiring them to consider the effects of tender offers on
nonshareholder constituencies. Delaware has followed this trend. However, it has
been the Delaware Supreme Court that has implemented these changes rather
than the state's legislature. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946, 955 (Del. 1985) (permitting directors to consider "the impact on 'constituen-
cies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps
even the community generally)" when making the determination of whether to ac-
cept a tender offer). Id. The Delaware Supreme Court subsequently clarified this
view, stating that when addressing a tender offer, the board may consider, "the
impact of both the bid and the potential acquisition on other constituencies, pro-
vided that it bears some reasonable relationship to general shareholder inter-
ests.... ." Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 n.29 (Del.
1988) (emphasis added). But see Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (holding that consideration of non-shareholder con-
stituencies is improper when an auction for the corporation is in progress).
18. Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A
Comparative Perspective, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 23 (1991). One of the first issues to
spur institutional investors to take a more active role in corporate matters was the
issue of management attempts and successes at hindering and preventing hostile
takeovers. Id. at 22. Takeovers were previously the most popular means to check
management's actions. Pound, supra note 11, at 83. However, the economic effi-
ciency of the takeover has been questioned as a method of "disciplin[ing] wayward
managers." Black, supra note 10, at 522. One commentator stated the following:
"Only a badly mismanaged target can justify the typical 50% takeover premium."
Id. See also THE BATTLE FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (Arnold W. Sametz & James L.
Bicksler eds., 1991) (discussing the financial efficiencies of the separation of owner-
ship and control including the effect of takeovers on the economic well being of the
corporate community).
19. See infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
20. In November, 1989, CalPERS delivered a petition to the SEC requesting
numerous changes in the proxy system. Letter from CalPERS to Linda C. Quinn,
Director of the Division of Corporate Finance, Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (Nov. 3, 1989) in 1 22ND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SEcuRmEs REGULATION 295,
306 (Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 712, 1990). The
CalPERS petition prompted other groups to petition Congress and/or the SEC to
promulgate rules to address the problems with the proxy regulations. Robert Ro-
senbaum, Big Investors Push For Power, CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 16, 1991, at 16.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol14/iss2/3
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holders. 21 As a result of these changes in the economic land-
scape and current legislative reform, future corporate change
will be effectuated largely through the proxy system: a battle of
words among shareholders, management, and dissidents. 22 The
hotly debated reforms, after over three years of drafting and
discussion,23 two SEC proposals 24 and subsequent comment so-
21. Special Supplement, Securities and Exchange Commission Final Rules on
Shareholder Communications and Disclosure on Executive Compensation, 24 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at S1 (Oct. 16, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Final Proxy
Amendments]. The revisions became effective on October 22, 1992, the date of pub-
lication in the Federal Register. 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (1992). Aside from a 30-day
transition period for any new proxy or information statement, form of proxy, peri-
odic report under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78U (1988
& Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter the Exchange Act], or request for a mailing or share-
holder list received after date of publication, all soliciting parties or registrants
must abide by the new rules. Id.
22. Pound, supra note 11, at 83-84. Martin Lipton, inventor of the poison pill
takeover prevention strategy and critic of the takeover era, argues that share-
holder democracy is far preferable to the hostile takeover as a device for disciplin-
ing corporate management. Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of
Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 66-67 (1987).
23. The SEC first proposed to revise the proxy rules on June 21, 1991, after it
learned of shareholder concern over the liability and costs associated with the
rules during its examination of limited partnership "roll up" transactions. SEC
Proposed Proxy Rule Amendments, 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 970
(June 21, 1991) [hereinafter 1991 Proposal].
After two years of debate within the SEC, House Energy and Commerce Com-
mittee Chairman John Dingell (D-Mich.) wrote a letter to the SEC on March 31,
1992 requesting an explanation for the delay in proxy reform. SEC Will Consider
Proxy Reform in The Near Future, Breeden Says, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No.
19, at 677 (May 8, 1992). Representative Dingell wanted a time schedule and char-
acterized the lack of action as "quite troubling." Breeden Asked to Explain Delay in
Reform of Proxy Rules, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 489 (Apr. 10, 1992)
(discussing the discourse between the Chairman of the SEC, Richard Breeden, and
the House Energy and Commerce Telecommunications Act Finance Sub-commit-
tee). Several months later, on October 15, 1992, the SEC published its final proxy
rules, which complied with its goal of having the new rules in place for the 1993
proxy season. See SEC will Move Quickly, Adopt Proxy Rule Proposals without
Great Change, According to Chairman Breeden, Corporate Counsel Weekly (BNA),
July 8, 1992, at 8 (reporting the SEC's goal of having new rules in place for the
1993 proxy season, Breeden stated, "[tihe time for talk on the issue has run out;
the time for action has arrived").
24. The SEC proposed revisions to the proxy rules on June 21, 1991, and then
re-proposed amendments subsequent to commentary by academics, the legal com-
munity, corporate concerns, and shareholders on July 15, 1992. See 1991 Proposal,
supra note 23, at 970; Securities and Exchange Commission's Proposed Rules on
Shareholder Communication, 24 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 23 (June 26,
1992) [hereinafter 1992 Reproposal].
9
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licitations,25 will purportedly allow "market forces" to restore a
"better sense of balance to America's [bloard rooms."26 The new
rules claim to facilitate communications among shareholders
and reduce the costs of complying with SEC regulations for per-
sons engaged in proxy solicitation.27
In its efforts to increase the amount of information avail-
able to shareholders, the SEC also increased the power avail-
able to institutional investors. Many have argued that the
American institutional investor could serve a role as a monitor
to check the excess or inefficiency of management. 28 While in-
stitutional investor activism may effectuate increased manage-
rial efficiency,29 it also presents new problems of accountability,
responsibility, and liability.30
Who will "watch" these new corporate "watchers?"31 Tradi-
tionally, the SEC has sought market and investor protection by
requiring full and complete disclosure of certain material infor-
mation effecting the value of the corporation,3 2 as well as pro-
25. 1991 Proposal, supra note 23, at 970. This high political drama pitted
management against shareholders and generated over 900 comment letters, in re-
sponse to the SEC's proposed revisions to the proxy regulations. Id. The re-propo-
sal elicited an additional 800 letters. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note
21, at S-2.
26. David R. Sands, Investors Victors in Wide SEC Reforms, WASH. TIMES,
Oct. 16, 1992, at Cl (quoting the then SEC Chairman, Richard Breeden).
27. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-1.
28. See generally Black, supra note 10, at 522 (discussing the debate concern-
ing impediments to shareholder actions in corporate governance, including the
proxy rules); John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olsen, Corporate Law and the Long-
term Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MmN. L. REV. 1313, 1327,
1361-63 (1992) (discussing how reform of the proxy system would effectuate
change in corporate governance).
29. See, e.g., Leslie Scism, Bottom-Line Activism of CalPERS Pays Off, New
Study Indicates, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1994, at C1 (reporting that the securities in
CalPERS's stock portfolio "handily" outperformed the S & P 500 Index as a result
of their active campaign in corporate governance).
30. MONKS & MiNow, supra note 14, at 10.
31. Debate, Can Pension Funds Lead the Ownership Revolution?, HARv. Bus.
REV., May-June 1991, at 166, 166 (statement by Ira M. Millstein, chairman, Board
of Advisors, Institutional Investor Project, Columbia University, and Senior Part-
ner, Weil, Gotshal and Manges).
32. Disclosure lies at the core of both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Ex-
change Act of 1934. As the Supreme Court stated in 1963: "A fundamental pur-
pose [of the federal securities regulatory scheme is] ... to substitute a philosophy
of full disclosure for a philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high stan-
dard of business ethics in the securities industry." SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
468
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viding stringent anti-fraud laws. 33 Large investors, as well as
corporate management, are required under both the Securities
Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Exchange Act to disclose
information disseminated and evaluated by the market. The
SEC's 1992 amendments tip the reporting balance by allowing
certain shareholder communications, which may have a
profound impact on the corporation and all other shareholders,
to go unregulated.
To analyze the effect of the 1992 Amendments, Part II of
this Article traces the evolution and significant rise of the insti-
tutional investor and its involvement in corporate America.
Part III examines the proxy structure, and Part IV analyzes the
old proxy rules, the perceived shortcomings of these rules, and
the SEC's 1992 amendments. Part V then analyzes the effect of
the amended proxy rules on institutions and individual share-
holders in the market. The SEC amendments that are benefi-
cial and increase efficiency are also discussed. Additionally,
particular attention is paid to the inherent dangers of deregu-
lating shareholder communications among large institutional
investors, and the use of the resultant leverage this gives the
institutional investor, a leverage which has been used to cir-
cumvent the entire proxy system. Finally, the insufficiency of
regulatory protection outside of the proxy regulations and the
effect of the 1992 Amendments on the proxy contest are ana-
lyzed and discussed.
This safeguard rests on the efficient market theory, which states that stock
markets are efficient at pricing securities. The premise underlying this theory is
that complete and full disclosure of all material information regarding a given
stock is disseminated, analyzed and evaluated by the market, and that since this
information is known by the market, the stock's selling price accurately reflects its
true market value. Christopher P. Saari, Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hy-
pothesis, Economic Theory and Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L.
REv. 1031, 1056 (1977). In recent years, the efficient market theory has become
the object of some criticism. See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Korn-
hauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 761 (1985) (contending that the markets are not as efficient as once
thought).
33. See generally Louis Loss, FuNDAMENTALs OF SECuRITIES REGULATION 699-
723 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the anti-fraud rules provided under the federal secur-
ities laws).
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II. The Institutional Investor
Although often discussed as a single group, modern institu-
tional investors are not necessarily homogeneous. 34 They may,
however, be classified into several different groups possessing
similar goals, alliances, risk preferences, and economic behav-
ior. These general classifications include: private, public, and
union pension funds; mutual fund investment companies; bank
non-pension trusts; insurance companies; and foundations and
endowments.35 Of these categories, the largest investors are
pension funds.36 To date, pension fund managers have also
been the most active institutions, led by the California State
Public Employee's Retirement System (CalPERS), which first
brought the modern institutional investor to the public's atten-
tion in 1989.37
Institutional investors are represented in the earliest
records of American corporations.38 From 1860 to 1912 the level
34. MONKS & MiNow, supra note 14, at 182. Institutional investors are char-
acterized as a diverse crowd in which money is "invested for different purposes and
with different obligations." Id. Their only common bond is that they are fiducia-
ries: entities, be they individuals or organizations, that manage "assets on behalf
of someone else." Id. They hold no duty or obligation to anyone but the people
whose money they manage. Id.
35. Carolyn Kay Brancato & Paul Gaughan, The Growth of Institutional In-
vestors in the United States Capital Markets, COLUM. U. CIR. FOR L. AND ECON.
STUD., INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS PROJECT (Nov. 1988). See also Buxbaum, supra
note 18, at 7 (providing another similar list of institutional investor types). Ap-
proximately 85% of all institutional investors may be classified under these gen-
eral groupings. Id.
The United States government makes a much broader categorization of insti-
tutional investors in its sectoral balance sheets and flow statements. These record-
ing lists delineate the following groups of financial institutions: mortgage
companies, finance companies, life insurance companies, fraternal insurance orga-
nizations, non-life insurance companies, private (non-insured) pension funds, state
and local pension funds, open-end investment companies, closed-end investment
companies, personal trust departments of commercial banks, common trust funds
of commercial banks, and securities brokers and dealers. RAYMOND GOLDSMITH,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE STOCK 27 (1973).
36. In 1991, pension fund holdings were believed to be up to 45% of U.S. eq-
uity, and they are predicted to be over 50% by the year 2000. Roberta S. Karmel,
Is it Time for a Federal Corporate Law?, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 55, 68 (1991).
37. See infra notes 78-86 and accompanying text (discussing shareholder so-
cial activism and the new trend of activism in corporate governance).
38. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 35, at 34-39; see also ALICIA H. MUNNELL, THE
ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 3 (1982) (reporting that the American Express
Company established the first private pensions in 1875). Though materials and
information are scarce for the period before 1900, corporate historians have de-
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of institutional investment in the market was low, representing
only from one and one-half to three and one-half percent of the
market.39 The advent of the industrial revolution with rapidly
expanding manufacturing, transportation, and mining compa-
nies increased the need for corporate equity and popularized the
securities markets. 40 However, institutional investment in cor-
porate equity still remained negligible, so that by 1929, institu-
tional investment had only increased to three percent.41
Then in the 1930s, institutional investment significantly
increased to seventeen percent.42 Subsequent to World War II,
the size of the institutional investor and its equity investment
grew tremendously. 43 This increase marked the beginning of
the emergence of the institutional investor as a significant fac-
tor in the securities markets." Accompanying the increase in
rived estimates of institutional involvement from available historical statements
and financial sources of the main groups of financial institutions. GoLDsMiTH,
supra note 35, at 34-35. The main source of documentation indicating the size of
institutional investors' assets in contemporary history is the national or sectorial
balance sheets. These sources were not prepared during the 19th century and only
benchmark years were recorded in the first half of the 20th century. Hence, re-
creation of the percentage of institutional ownership is difficult for this era. Id.
See also MoNKs & MINow, supra note 14, at 182-83 (tracing the origins of institu-
tional investment to the use of trusts in the 1780s).
39. GOLDSMITH, supra note 35, at 73. The share of institutional ownership of
corporate outstanding equity rose to a high of 3 1/2% in 1860 and then fell to a low
of 1 112% in 1912. Id.
40. The railroad especially played a part in bringing the corporation into
prominence in the United States economy. Id. at 35.
The supply of stock in non-financial corporations from 1860 to 1952 is as
follows:
YEAR NET ISSUE (MV)* OUTSTANDING ISSUES (MV)*
1860 $ 1,100,000,000 $ 18,000,000,000
1880 7,200,000,000 38,000,000,000
1900 15,000,000,000 56,000,000,000
1912 23,000,000,000 89,000,000,000
1922 37,600,000,000 88,000,000,000
1929 42,500,000,000 160,000,000,000
1939 -26,400,000,000 100,000,000,000
1945 24,000,000,000 61,000,000,000
1952 90,700,000,000 56,000,000,000
*indicates market value at end of year listed
Id. at 38 tbl. 2-2.
41. Id. at 73.
42. Id. at 80.
43. Id.
44. GOLDSMrrH, supra note 35, at 72-73.
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institutional investment was a diversification of the institu-
tional investment portfolio.45 Investments were spread over a
variety of stocks rather than concentrated in the bank and rail-
road industries as previously had been the case. 46
The increase in funds available to institutional investment
was connected with changed investor preferences. 47 There was
a gradual shift of investor preference away from direct holding
of stock in favor of indirect holding through mutual funds and
pensions.48 Furthermore, during this time period, individual
households shifted their preferred investment option from real
estate assets to financial assets.49 These changes resulted in
tremendous growth in pension and mutual funds. Prior to the
"post-war period," investment was primarily the province of the
wealthy who were shareholders as the beneficiaries of trusts.50
At the close of the war, pension plans, insurance companies and
investment funds began to amass the resources of the lower and
middle income segments of the population and to invest them in
the securities markets. 51 Indirect investment, through institu-
tional investors, grew in significance because of what many
viewed as the shortcomings of other United States retirement
plans and methods.52
Today, three primary means exist to provide for retirement
in the United States: government organized retirement plans
(such as social security); employer and employee agreements
(private pension plans); and "individually purchased" retire-
ment plans (such as annuities). 53 Social security was never
meant to be the sole source of retirement income, and many
45. Id. at 80-81.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 204.
48. Id.
49. GOLDSMITH, supra note 35, at 204.
50. Id. at 81.
51. Id.
52. Buxbaum, supra note 18, at 10. As one commentator noted, "no motive in
man's history has been more constant or more obvious than his quest for security."
PAUL P. HARBRECHT, PENSION FUNDS AND ECONOMIC POWER 3 (1959). It is sug-
gested that this "national psychology" stems from the financial situation most
Americans faced as a result of the Great Depression. MUNNELL, supra note 38, at
8. Historical factors, such as World War II wage controls, inflation and tax
changes also contributed to the American interest in retirement security. Id. at 8.
53. Buxbaum, supra note 18, at 7. In 1986, these state, private and local pen-
sions covered 45.28% of the United States labor force and in 1980 over one quarter
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doubt its future viability as a source of retirement income. 54
The other two non-public sources contribute an aggregate of
forty percent of all retirement income. 55 The demise of social
security, whether perceived or actual, has made other sources of
retirement income a necessity56 and has forced the middle class
to increase savings, revise company pension plans, and en-
courage increased employer funding of pension plans. 57
Along with the rise of institutional investment came a shift
in the investment strategies of institutional investors, away
from government securities and into corporate equity.5 8 In the
decade following World War II, the interest rate on private de-
bentures shadowed the government interest rate.59 Consist-
ently higher returns offered in the equity markets induced
institutional investors to invest an increased share of fund as-
sets in the stock market. 60 Both state and federal deregulation
also permitted new categories of institutional investors to enter
or increase their equity positions in the equity markets.61 While
of the individuals over 60 received benefits from such pensions. LAWRENCE J. KoT-
LIKOFF & DANIEL E. SMITH, PENSIONS IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 3, 4 (1983).
54. Buxbaum, supra note 18, at 7. One commentator refers to social security
as a "current account system" in which the "last generation" may or may not bene-
fit from the "bargain." Id. This fear is vividly brought to life by the fact that social
security revenues almost equalled expenditures for the period from the mid 1950s
to 1983. HENRY J. AARON ET AL., CAN AMERICA AFFORD TO GROW OLD? PAYING FOR
SOCIAL SECURTrrY 1 (1989). The viability of social security is questioned because in
the near future the baby-boomer generation will retire, and the average lifespan
has increased while the birth rate has decreased. Id. at 2. During this period, the
government increased benefits without any commensurate increase in taxes. Id.
This resulted in an underfunded public retirement system where a great number
of retirees would be supported by a fewer number of employees. Id. at 3.
55. Buxbaum, supra note 18, at 8. Pensions have remained a steady fixture in
retirement income at 15% but have not grown in prominence. Id. Private arrange-
ments, however, have risen to over 25%. Id.
56. Id. at 9-10. Social security may only offer $975.00 per person per month,
at minimum, and 150% of this per couple for the "practically unobtainable maxi-
mum." Id. at 10.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. For example, in the late 1950s state law restrictions were liberalized to
permit life insurance companies to invest a higher percentage of their assets in the
stock market. GOLDsMITH, supra note 35, at 230. Additionally, in 1962 federal
legislation governing personal trusts was significantly liberalized increasing the
equity owned by personal trusts from $3.6 billion in 1962 to $9.5 billion in 1968.
Id. at 241.
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the returns were high, the conservative nature of this period's
institutional investors provided for only a slow and steady mi-
gration of capital into the equity markets.62
Congressional enactment of the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)63 in 1974 also fueled the
growth and spurred the activism of state and local pension
funds. 64 Through ERISA, Congress wished to provide private
companies with incentives to create pension plans and to pro-
tect plan beneficiaries against inadequate funding and mis-
dealing.65 Growth in pension funds was achieved by providing
employers significant tax benefits for creating private pen-
sions.66 Protection of the investment was accomplished through
62. Id. at 265. Professor Goldsmith notes the "striking" difference in the
speed at which different types of institutional investors shifted from a debt to an
equity portfolio. Id. at 264. The pension, insurance and bank funds made a more
conservative transition while capital-appreciation oriented funds made the transi-
tion at an accelerated pace. Id.
63. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-14 (1988)).
64. Clifford L. Whitehill, Institutional Ownership, in INSTITUTIONAL INVES-
Tors: PASSIVE FIDUCIARIES To ACTIVIST OwNERS 75, 79 (PLI Corp. Law and Prac-
tice Handbook Series No. 704, 1990). One commentator related that the Labor
Department estimated that ERISA funds were valued at $2 trillion in 1990.
MoNKS & MINow, supra note 14, at 187; see also Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Insti-
tutional Shareholders Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L. REv. 97, 148
(1988) (concluding that "in response to the requirements imposed by ... ERISA,
pension fund assets have risen to more than $1.5 trillion, up from $548 billion in
1970").
Before ERISA, pension funds had amassed significant assets, however, many
pensions were not fully funded. See generally HARBRECHT, supra note 52, at 5-11
(discussing the influences which shaped pension funds and explaining their tre-
mendous growth prior to 1956). Ultimately the move into the corporate securities
area greatly benefitted the pension trusts, which by 1959 had become the largest
purchasers of stock and had purchased almost as much stock as individual inves-
tors as a whole. Id. at 3.
Employees also pressured employers to "fully fund" private pension systems
and a majority of employers complied. Id. Government pensions followed suit
both fully funding their pensions and increasing benefits. Id. Employees had been
applying pressure to establish pension funds prior to ERISA. Id. at 7. As the sub-
committee of Labor & Public Welfare noted in 1956: "[s]ince 1948 the labor unions
have put on a drive to obtain welfare and pension programs." Id. (citing S. REP.
No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1956)). However, prior to ERISA, companies
had been resisting complying with these demands. Id.
65. MONKS & MNow, supra note 14, at 187.
66. Edward W. Brankey & Frank P. Darr, Debtor Interests in Pension Plans as
Property of the Debtor's Estate, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 275, 279 (1990).
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imposing fiduciary duties on ERISA pension fund managers.67
Under ERISA, the fiduciary must act for the benefit of and
"solely in the interests of... the plan's participants and benefi-
ciaries."68 Increasingly, institutional investors have cited the
proper discharge of these fiduciary duties as the driving force
behind their renewed interest in corporate governance. 69 More-
over, in 1988, the Department of Labor determined that a proxy
vote was an economic asset of the fund that cannot be wasted,
because to do so would result in an actionable breach of fiduci-
These benefits included the following:
1. The employer can deduct its contributions to the plan ... currently even
though the employee may receive no benefit that year. 2. Generally, earn-
ings and gains on plan funds are exempt from taxation during accumula-
tion. 3. Participants are taxed on benefits only when funds are actually
received. 4. The first $5,000 of the death benefit from [the employee's] ac-
count... can go to the beneficiary free of income tax. Also, an employee's
voluntary nondeductible contributions are recovered income-tax-free.
Id. at 279 n.35 (citing Pens. & Profit Sharing (P-H), 5010 (1984) (first alteration
in original)).
67. Sommer, supra note 10, at 363. Other sources of law provide a fiduciary
standard for institutional investment. In addition to ERISA, federal law governs
any "breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct" in an investment
company through the Investment Company Act. Robert D. Rosenbaum & Eileen
M. Lavigne, Fiduciary Duty Limitations on Voting and Investment Policies of Insti-
tutional Investors, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS: PASSIVE FIDUCIALuES TO ACTIVIST
OwNERs 133, 135 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 704,
1990) (quoting § 36(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35
(1988)). The Internal Revenue Code provides a similar fiduciary duty to public
funds if they wish to retain tax-exempt status. Id. at 136. Banking law regula-
tions also impose a self-dealing restriction on bank managed trust funds. Id. at
135. State law regulates institutional investment through trust law, both statu-
tory law and common law; state insurance laws; state pension statutes such as
those in California and New York; and uniform statutes, such as the Uniform
Management of Institutional Funds Act, a uniform act regulating charitable orga-
nizations that was adopted by 32 states as of 1990. Id. at 136. All these duties, as
well as those imposed by ERISA, have been cited by institutional investors as re-
quiring and justifying their activism. See Id. at 135.
68. Sommer, supra note 10, at 363 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988)).
69. "The Reagan and Bush administrations have encouraged more activist"
institutional investment through statements from the Labor Department expres-
sing "the view that ERISA-governed pension plan fiduciaries have a duty to be
activist shareholders, seeking to influence or replace underperforming manage-
ment." Robert D. Rosenbaum & Michael E. Korens, Trends in Institutional Share-
holder Activism: What the Institutions are Doing Today, in INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS: PASSMST FIDUCIARIES To AcTEv OwNERs, 45, 48 (PLI Corp. Law and
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 704, 1990) (citing David George Ball, Assis-
tant Secretary of Labor, Address before the Financial Executives Institute (Jan.
13, 1990)).
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ary duty owed to the plan beneficiaries. 70 As a result, pension
funds regulated by ERISA have become the most active institu-
tional investors in corporate governance.
Contemporaneous with the growth of pension funds and
other institutional investors was the emergence of a share-
holder voice for management accountability. Early participants
in this movement were corporate gadflies who did not have a lot
of capital or the ability to garner support into coalitions, but
who did present their message to management at annual meet-
ings. 71 Other individuals used similar populist themes to create
profit.72 However, the messages delivered by these sharehold-
ers were never unified, and it was not until the 1970s when in-
stitutional investors adopted these themes that this message
caught the attention of management.
Due to these influences, individual institutions have grown
to substantial size and wield awesome power. As a group, insti-
tutional investors control fifty-three percent of the United
States equity markets, and over sixty percent of the equity of
the fifty largest companies.7 3 In the aggregate, the figures are
70. Letter from The Department of Labor, Pension & Welfare Program to Mr.
Helmuth Fandl, Chairman of the Retirement Board, Avon Products, Inc. (Feb. 23,
1988) (in 1988 ERISA LEXIS 19, *5).
71. Individuals such as Wilma Saus, Norm Gilbert and Evalyn Davis lead this
movement. These participants were often viewed as "unmitigated nuisance[s]" by
corporate boards. Annual Meeting Time, FORBES, Apr. 15, 1976, at 40, 40. Over
time, however, their themes and ideas have become more palatable to corporate
management. Id.
72. One of the most successful entrepreneurs with this strategy was T. Boone
Pickens. See, e.g., James Buchan, Pickens Backs in Takeover Trail; T. Boone Pick-
ens, OIL DAILY, Sept. 10, 1987, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File
(noting that Picken's "populist attacks on the Good '01 Boys - the corporate bu-
reaucrats with their hunting camps and fancy aircraft are his stock in trade').
73. For example, institutional investors own 69% of the outstanding shares of
Eli Lilly, 63% of the outstanding shares of American Express, and 60% of the out-
standing shares of American Home Products. Edward B. Rock, The Logical and
(Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEo. L.J. 445,
447-48 n.5 (1991) (citing Carolyn Kay Brancato, The Pivotal Role of Institutional
Investors in Capital Markets, tbl. 8, (Salomon Brothers Center and Rutgers Center
Conference on the Fiduciary Responsibilities of Institutional Investors) (June 14-
15, 1990) (copy on file at the Georgetown Law Journal)). In 1989, the largest 20
funds owned 10.6% of the outstanding shares of General Motors, 9.1% of the out-
standing shares of IBM, and 8.5% of the outstanding shares of General Electric.
Conley & O'Barr, supra note 12, at 823 (citing WILLIAM O'BARR & JOHN M. CON-
LEY, FORTUNE AND FOLLY: THE WEALTH AND POWER OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING,
tbl. 2.8 (1992)).
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even more astounding. Institutional investors in the United
States own more than $6.5 trillion in assets, an amount equal to
more than a fifth of all United States' assets.74 The immensity
of their holdings has mooted the traditional 'Wall Street Rule"
which states that if the shareholder does not like how the com-
pany operates, he sells the stock. 75 When ownership interests
are substantial, it is difficult for a shareholder to quickly or ef-
fectively divest his interests; any wholesale dumping of the
stock will saturate the market and significantly reduce the
share price.76
74. See Conley & O'Barr, supra note 12, at 823. In 1989, the top 50 institu-
tional investors owned approximately $923 billion in equity or 53% of total domes-
tic equity. The Institutional Investor 300; Ranking America's Top Money
Managers, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 1990, at 137, 173.
75. Jayne W. Barnard, Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Govern-
ance, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1135, 1151 (1991). The "Wall Street Rule" is representative
of conventional investor wisdom initially presented by Berle and Means in 1932.
See ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 81 (1933). But see Mike Myers, 3M Shares Fall $10 on News of Disap-
pointing Earnings, Institutional Investors Unload Shares After Second-Quarter
Sales Said to be Up 3%, STAR TRIn., June 11, 1993, at D1 (reporting that institu-
tional investors "stampeded" to sell their 3M holdings after an announcement of
disappointing U.S. sales).
76. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 75, at D1 (reporting a $10 per share decline,
approximately 8%, after institutional investors dumped their shares of 3M corpo-
ration). These costs can be prohibitive. For example, consider the situation of a
large institutional investor which owns one percent of the outstanding shares or
300,000 shares in a blue chip corporation. If the institution, disappointed by cor-
porate management, seeks to employ the "Wall Street Rule" and sell its position it
will incur significant losses as a result of both the transaction costs and the decline
in market value associated with the sale. Assuming transaction costs of two cents
per share, in a negotiated transaction, the total transaction costs of selling the
stock could exceed $60,000. See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu, New Financial Products, the
Modern Process of Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69
TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1304 (1991) (reporting that, in 1988, the transaction costs for
institutional investors selling substantial blocks of stock averaged less than $.05
per share). The movement of such a large block of stock will also have a negative
effect on the security's stock market price. Assume that selling such a block
reduces the stock price four dollars per share due to the supply and demand condi-
tions in the market and the perceived negative signal received in the market when
a large owner undertakes wholesale withdrawal from the corporation. Thus, the
investor would have compounded his loss by $600,000 (assuming an average with-
draw price at a two dollar discount). In addition to the transaction costs associated
with buying new shares, the dissatisfied investor would incur costs of over one half
a million dollars for choosing the solution offered by the Wall Street Rule, selling
his stock. As one commentator noted, "[tihe sheer size of this stake and the trad-
ing costs associated with selling makes the institution 'captive.'" Pound, supra
note 11, at 87.
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Prior to the 1980s, institutional investors often sided with
corporate management, supporting their slate and voting for
their propositions. 77 During this period, the only instances
where institutional investors diverged from this alliance was in
regard to social issues during the era of corporate responsibil-
ity.78 These proposals, however, were often unsuccessful due to
the difficulty in generating support among other investors,
whether institutional or individual.
In the 1980s, proxy solicitors, insurgent shareholders, and
corporate management realized that institutional investors
held the key or swing votes for important proxy initiatives.7 9
Moreover, institutional investors often were the deciding votes
in takeover transactions. 80 During this era, the institutional in-
vestors increasingly voted against management-proposed take-
over defenses, 81 preferring the premiums which tender offers
provided to the market price. Tender offers represented the
perfect solution to the institutional investors disinvestment di-
lemma:8 2 in one transaction the institution could sell its entire
77. Barnard, supra note 6, at 1150.
78. Rosenbaum & Korens, supra note 69, at 45-47. Social activists began us-
ing the proxy system and shareholder influence in the late 1960s. BEVIS LONG-
STRETH & H. DAVID ROSENBLOOM, CORPORATE SocIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
INSTITUTMONAL INVESTOR, A REPORT TO THE FORD FOUNDATION 3 (1973). The proxy
system was first used to promote social concerns in the Kodak-FIGHT campaign of
1967. Id. FIGHT, a civil rights group, formed a coalition with religious institu-
tional investors to change minority hiring practices at Kodak Corporation. Id. at
4. A wave of shareholder activism followed. Id. at 12. Mutual funds even capital-
ized on this social activism by establishing funds which solely invested in corpora-
tions catering to certain social concerns, such as "green funds." Id. at 20-23.
79. Barnard, supra note 6, at 1159.
80. See, e.g., Marlene Star, Investors Set Own Course; Both Management, Dis-
sident Get Shareholder Support, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, June 10, 1991, at 62,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (noting that several large institu-
tional investors cast the deciding votes in the battle for control over Baltimore
Bancorp).
81. See, e.g., Barnard, supra note 6, at 1166 (reporting that in 1987 there were
more than 50 anti-poison pill proposals); Corporate Counsel Weekly (BNA), Aug.
28, 1991, at 5 (reporting the 1991 proxy results: 30 proposals to rescind poison pill
proposals were considered receiving an average favorable vote of 31.4% of the out-
standing shares, and 18 golden parachute proposals averaging a favorable vote of
22.54% of the outstanding shares).
82. Institutional investors in this era were criticized for being short-term in-
vestors. In seeking proxy reform, certain institutional investors have responded
by stating that they abide by long term investment philosophies. See, e.g., Letter
from CalPERS to Linda C. Quinn, Director of the Division of Corporate Finance,
Securities and Exchange Commission 2 (Nov. 3, 1989) in 1 22ND ANNuAL INSTITUTE
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interest at one price, often at a significant premium to market
price.
As the merger era ended, institutional investors sought a
more active role in merger transactions by assisting insurgents
during proxy contests and seeking to either prevent manage-
ment from implementing anti-takeover provisions or to force
the removal of such provisions.8 3 Corporate raiders with the
support of large organized institutional investors often pres-
sured management into a tender84 However, the demise of
ON SECURITIES REGULATION 295, 299 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course Hand-
book Series No. 712, 1990) (contending that during the past 10 years their average
holding period for a stock has been between 6 to 10 years).
However, even where there are long holding periods, institutional investors do
not possess any long-term interest in the corporations in which they invest. Long
holding periods merely represent the practical nature of their situation: institu-
tional investors often hold shares for long periods because of the immensity of their
holdings. It is difficult to remove a large equity interest from the market without
significantly depressing the price received by the institutional investor. See My-
ers, supra note 75, at D1 (giving an example of this dilemma).
Furthermore, many funds are indexed, which means that they seek a repre-
sentation of the entire market rather than only certain corporations. Therefore,
institutional investors will retain their interests in a corporation to maintain
proper diversification. Many large institutional investors have realized they
"were too large and slow afoot to capture the bargains or to escape the bad news"
and, hence, indexed their funds. Louis Lowenstein, The Effects of Index Invest-
ment Policies on Corporate Governance, in 2 23RD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 597, 603 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 755, 1991). Indexing is a way for large investors to "buy a slice of American
industry as a whole," id., and reduce transaction costs incurred by more active
traders. See Myers, supra note 75, at D1.
These are the reasons institutional investors may be considered "long term
investors," and not because of any long term beneficial interests to the corporation.
Tender offers represent the perfect opportunity to divest a heavy equity position at
a premium and institutions often would court them regardless of any long-term
interests of the corporation.
83. See, e.g., Marcia Parker, Proxy System is '88 Targets, PENSIONS & INVEST-
MENT AGE, Mar. 7, 1988, at 1 (noting that institutional investors are opposing the
adoption of poison pills and other takeover defenses or urging their removal).
In early 1993, 29 companies faced shareholder proposals to remove poison
pills. Poison Pill, CORP. GOVERNANCE SERVICE BACKGROUND REPS. (IRRC) DD-1
(Feb. 10, 1993). This number is down from prior years due to the present reduc-
tions in hostile takeovers. Other defensive measures targeted in 1993 were pro-
posals to reincorporate in states with less merger regulation or to opt out of state
takeover statutes. See Poison Pill, CORP. GOVERNANCE SERVICE BACKGROUND
REPS. (IRRC) at 00-1 (Mar. 2, 1993).
84. Management realized institutional investors were the key to a successful
tender offer defense and developed Shareholder Advisory Committees and held
meetings with institutional investors to gain their allegiance. Leslie Wayne, Seek-
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high risk debt instruments and the subsequent decline in
tender offers has temporally stymied the takeover game. Insti-
tutional investors, no longer satisfied with being silent parties,
and desirous of the profits of the merger and acquisitions era,85
seek active participation in corporate management. 86 In con-
trast to the social responsibility proposals of the 1970s, today's
institutional investors seek participation on an advisory basis
on matters such as executive compensation, corporate adoption
of takeover defenses, and corporate governance matters.8 7
One of the methods utilized by institutional investors to
participate in corporate governance, Rule 14a-8 88 shareholder
proposals,8 9 is unchanged by the 1992 proxy amendments.
ing to Stay Out of Proxy Battles, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 8, 1991, at D1. Management of
some corporations used these methods to successfully avoid a hostile takeover.
See, e.g., Marlene G. Star, Avon Shareholders Agree; Pre-proxy Deal Calls for In-
vestor Meetings, Secret Vote, PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS, Apr. 1, 1991, at 3 (report-
ing how Avon's management courted CalPERS and other large shareholders to
avoid a hostile offer by Chartwell Associates). Poison Pill, CORP. GOVERNANCE SER-
VICE BACKGROUND REPS. (IRRC) DD-1 (Feb. 10, 1993).
85. See, e.g., Stephen E. Clark, Push Comes to Shove on Proxy Reform, INSTI-
TUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1991, at 83, 84 ("[wlatching takeover artists use the
proxy system profitably, public funds, were inspired to use the system as leverage
to influence management").
86. See, e.g., Kevin G. Salwen & Joann S. Lublin, Giant Investors Flex Their
Muscles More at U.S. Corporations, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1992, at Al ("[sipurred by
anger over skyrocketing executive pay," institutional investors are pressing boards
of directors for reforms instead of just selling shares when dissatisfied with man-
agement); Myron Magnet, Directors, Wake Up!, FORTUNE, June 15, 1992, at 85, 91-
92 (observing that institutional investors are becoming more active, and having
success, in underperforming companies).
One fund manager stated, "[Wihen it gets right down to it, I can say to the
managers, 'Wait a minute, fellas-we own the company. You get it?'" Id. at 91
(quoting Chuck Ames, Partner, Clayton Dubiier & Rice) (emphasis in original).
Another commentator has suggested that public pension funds may become
the new corporate raiders of the 1990s, using their power as investors to make
money at the expense of the corporate employees. Donald L. Bartlett & James B.
Steele, Raiders with Innocent Airs, ACROSS THE BOARD, July-Aug. 1992, at 13. Fill-
ing the void left by the demise of the corporate raiders, institutional investors will
encourage restructuring, curtailing benefits and reducing salaries. Id.
87. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
88. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1993). While this provision of the rules was not
amended, its significance has been magnified because shareholders have more
freedom to communicate which allows them to garner support for various share-
holder proposals.
89. Id. There are various limitations on the use of shareholder proposals.
Only a record or beneficial owner of at least one percent or $1,000 who holds such
equity for at least one year through the record date may submit a statement. Id.
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Although shareholder proposals are merely precatory and ex-
cludable under certain circumstances, 90 they have had a signifi-
cant influence on corporate governance. 91
III. The Proxy System: An Overview
The right to vote by use of a proxy did not exist at common
law.92 Voting rights were seen as a personal trust, a remnant
from the time when corporations were created not for profit, but
instead, for civic ventures.93 As a personal trust, shares were
unassignable.94 In later times, corporate charters could provide
for a proxy, yet it remained common practice to vote shares in
person or abstain from the vote.95 This rule existed until the
end of the nineteenth century when commerce in the United
States exploded with the advent of the industrial revolution. 96
The new economic environment of this epoch proved amenable
§ 240.14a-8(a)(1). The statement itself is regulated; it is limited to 500 words, its
contents must be verified and documented, the proponent must be identified, and
it must be filed 120 calendar days before the annual meeting. Id. § 240.14a-
8(a)(4), (a)(3), (b)(1), (b)(2).
90. Under Rule 14a-8, a corporation may only exclude a shareholder proposal
under limited circumstances. A proposal may be excluded if it (1) is not a proper
proposal under state law; (2) is false or misleading; (3) violates state, federal or
foreign law; (4) violates the proxy rules; (5) merely seeks redress for a personal
offense; (6) is not related to the company's business; or (7) pertains to the ordinary
business of the corporation. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1)-(7). In order to take ad-
vantage of these excludable grounds, the corporation must utilize the SEC's review
process. Id. § 240.14a-8(d). The "burden of proof [is] upon management to show
that a particular security holder's proposal is not a proper one for inclusion in
management's proxy material." Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Securi-
ties Exchange Act Release No. 4979, 1954 SEC LEXIS 38, at *3 (Jan. 6, 1954).
91. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
92. Charles S. Telly, Proxies and the Modern Corporation: Scienter Under Sec-
tions 14a and lOb of the Securities Exchange Act, 19 TULSA L.J. 491, 500 (1984).
The first corporations were municipal and charitable corporations whose purposes
did not involve monetary considerations. Voting rights were considered a personal
obligation and could not be "delegated." Id.
93. Leonard H. Axe, Corporate Proxies: 11, 41 MICH. L. REV. 225, (1942) (quot-
ing 17 D.C. App. 144 (1900)).
94. Id.
95. Telly, supra note 92, at 500-01. Under English law, the power to establish
a corporation was granted from the Crown. Id. As corporations developed under
English law, they became recognized as creatures of statute and, accordingly,
when the proxy became accepted it was only accepted if expressly granted by the
corporate charter. Id. at 501-02.
96. Id. at 503.
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to the corporate form, 97 and as the corporation became the fa-
vored type of business organization, ownership became widely
diffused among investors nationwide. A voting rule that re-
quired each and every shareholder to attend the shareholder
meeting, often in different states, or even different countries,
became inadequate. 98 The common law requirements proved a
formidable barrier to corporate growth.99
Corporations responded by allowing shareholders to vote by
proxy solicitations as well as at shareholder meetings. Con-
cerned about the fraud and market manipulation that occurred
in the 1920s under an unregulated proxy system, Congress en-
acted legislation as part of the Exchange Act to regulate a
proxy's contents, usage, and disclosure. 100 Through the Ex-
97. Limited liability encouraged investment by limiting the investor's finan-
cial risk to the amount of the investment. By limiting a shareholder's liability to
the value of his investment, the present value of future expected returns became
the sole determinant of a share's value rather than the potential liabilities of the
investor. The shares were valued the same by all investors, thereby making
shares fungible and allowing for the creation of the financial markets.
There are, however, certain circumstances where the courts have disregarded
the corporate fiction of limited liability and held the owners personally liable for
the acts of the corporation. See generally I. MAURICE WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE
CoRPoRATE FICTION AND ALLIED CORPORATION PROBLEMS 1-41 (1927) (examining
the various instances where the courts will disregarded the corporate fiction and
explaining the courts' rationales).
98. The large number of stockholders in the present day corporation makes
attendance by a stockholder at a meeting for the purpose of voting completely "im-
practicable." See generally Telly, supra note 92, at 503-07 (discussing the indus-
trial revolution in the United States and its effect on the development of the
modern corporation). Requiring owners to be present eviscerated any ownership
rights shareholders possessed. See generally Loss, supra note 32, at 449-54 (con-
tending that due to widespread ownership, proxy regulations make the proxy sys-
tem either a "tremendous force of good or evil in our economic system").
99. Loss, supra note 33, at 449-54.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national
securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interests or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the
use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of
any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to sec-
tion 781 of this title.
Id. § 78n(a).
The proxy regulations have been revised and amended numerous times since
their promulgation in 1935. 4 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 1936-44. The
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change Act, Congress granted broad rule making discretion to
the SEC,101 under which the SEC has enacted and tailored a
series of elaborate rules which regulate proxy material and
shareholder communications. 1 2 Today, proxies are the primary
period from 1935 to 1965 was an evolutionary stage in the rule's development that,
for the most part, created the rules prior to the 1992 revisions. Id. Revisions in
the late 1960s either harmonized the proxy rules with other Securities legislation,
codified long standing Commission practices, or were technical in nature. Id.
Amendments in 1972, 1976, and 1983, enacted in response to periods of share-
holder activism, liberalized shareholder proposal rules and established share-
holder voting disclosure rules. Id. See also id. at 1936-44 (discussing the history
of the evolution of the proxy rules at length).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The ability of the Commission
to adopt rules under § 14(a) is granted in the text of § 14. The scope of this power
has been limited to disclosure, and the SEC is not permitted to grant substantive
rights relegated to state corporate law. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406
(D.C. Cir. 1990). The court in Business Roundtable stated:
[W]e find that the Exchange Act cannot be understood to include regulation
of an issue that is so far beyond matters of disclosure (such as are regulated
under § 14 of the [Exchange] Act), and of the management and practices of
self-regulatory organizations, and that is concededly a part of corporate gov-
ernance traditionally left to the states.
Id. at 408.
The United States Supreme Court has also indicated that the SEC's rule will
be deemed unconstitutional if it invades the province of state corporate law. See
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69 (1987). Furthermore, when regulating
proxies the court must determine whether holding a person's communication sub-
ject to the proxy rules may infringe on his First Amendment right to free speech.
See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 1985)
(recognizing, yet not addressing, the merits of a First Amendment defense of proxy
regulation). The Commission recognized that the old proxy rules had raised "seri-
ous questions under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment." 1992 Final
Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-16.
102. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 to 240.14d-103 (1993). An overview of the
functions and the mechanics of the original rules are necessary in order to under-
stand the 1992 proxy amendments. Briefly, Rule 14a-1 contains definitions of sev-
eral key terms utilized throughout the rules. Rule 14a-2 identifies the types of
solicitations which trigger the proxy rules. The information required in proxy
statements and supporting documents, such as an annual shareholder report and
10K form, is specified in Rule 14a-3. The next two rules, 14a-4 and 14a-5, specify
the informational requirements of the proxy and the format of information con-
tained in the proxy statement. These rules emphasize clarity in the format of both
the proxy and proxy statement in order to avoid manipulation or deception. Rule
14a-6 describes the necessary requirements for filing with the SEC. Rule 14a-7
governs the mailing of security holder communications, pursuant to a request by a
security holder, particularly the type of communication and assignment of costs.
Another type of shareholder communication contained in the proxy, the share-
holder proposal, is governed by Rule 14a-8. Shareholder proposals differ from 14a-
7 inclusions in that they impose no cost on the shareholder; however, their content
25
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means of corporate shareholder voting and serve an important
function in corporate governance. 03
Under the Exchange Act, 0 4 the generic term "'proxy' in-
cludes every proxy, consent or authorization within the mean-
ing of section 14(a) of the [Exchange] Act." 05 The first of these
three items, "proxy," 06 generally refers to a contract: a contract
between the record holder of a corporate security and a third
party that grants the third party the authority to vote the rec-
is limited and not every shareholder may make one. Rule 14a-10 prohibits any
person from soliciting any undated proxies, post-dated proxies, and proxies
"deemed" to be dated after signed by the security holder. Rule 14a-11 regulates
solicitations of proxies for corporate elections, specifically the election of the board
of directors. Rule 14a-12 governs solicitations that precede a proxy statement, al-
lowable under certain circumstances. The next rule, Rule 14a-13, regulates the
registrant's duties when communicating with beneficial owners. The ability of the
registrant to communicate with beneficial owners is important because identifica-
tion of beneficial owners may be the key to a successful proxy contest. Finally,
14a-14 dictates when proxy documents are modified or superseded. 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.14a-1 to .14a-14, .14d-103 (1992).
103. R. FRANKLN BALOrrI ET AL., MEETINGS OF STocKHoLDERs § 5.1, at 51
(1987 & Supp. 1990). The proxy system has been a means for corporate control
since the promulgation of the first proxy rules in 1935. Klaus Eppler & Edward W.
Scheuermann, Overview of The History and Current Uses of Proxy and Consent
Solicitation Contests: Shareholder Challenges and Management Responses, in
PROXY CONTESTS, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR INITIATIVES, MANAGEMENT RESPONSES
9, 11 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 696, 1990). In
1968, these commentators noted that the proxy contest was a growing tool to at-
tain corporate control while also recognizing the rapid growth of" 'a new corporate
device-the so-called tender offer or takeover bid'." Id. (quoting EDWARD R. ARA-
NOW & HERBERT A. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL V (2d ed.
1968)).
104. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
105. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(f) (1992).
106. Proxy refers generally to the "statutory fundamentals of Securities Reg-
ulation." Loss, supra note 33, at 454 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 (1992)). The
proxy part of the trilogy refers to the actual voting card which is sent to sharehold-
ers and is returned as an authorization to vote as the card designates. Id. at 454
n.17; see also infra note 251 (providing a sample proxy card under the revised
proxy rules). Consent and authorization have been used by the courts to broaden
the scope of the proxy rules far beyond the proxy card. A broad reading of these
terms has led one court to hold an invitation to enter into a voting trust as regu-
lated by the rules. Loss, supra note 33, at 454 (citing Greater Iowa Corp. v. Mc-
Lendon, 378 F.2d 783, 796-98 (8th Cir. 1967)). However, other courts have limited
expansive interpretations such as this, substituting broad interpretations of other
statutory terms. For example, another court interpreted the definition of "securi-
ties" to include voting trust certificates and solicitations in connection with the
sale of securities. Id. (citing Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 499
F.2d 715, 725 (8th Cir. 1974)).
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ord holder's shares at the shareholders' meeting. 107 The next
two items, "consent" and "authorization," have been interpreted
by courts not to be limited by the previous term "proxy."108 This
allows the words "consent" and "authorization" to be given a
distinct and broader reading beyond what is thought of as a
traditional proxy. 09 Courts have held that this is in accord
with the characterization of the Exchange Act as a remedial
statute that should be construed broadly.110
The definition of proxy is so broad because whether voting
by consent, abstaining from a vote, or assigning a voting right, a
shareholder requires information regarding the corporate ac-
tion and, thus, the potential for manipulation exists. Hence,
107. The right to vote extends to a proxy or any "consent or authorization
within the meaning of Section 14(a)." BALOrrI.ET AL., supra note 103, § 5.4, at 55
(citing Rule 14a-l(f); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-l(f) (1992)).
108. See, e.g., Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 796 (8th Cir.
1967) (holding that "consent" and "authorization" are "extremely broad words"
and are "not limited by the word proxy").
109. See Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 766 (5th Cir. 1974). The word
consent also represents another form of voting outside of a shareholder meeting. A
consent allows the shareholder to act or vote through a writing under limited cir-
cumstances. The substantive law of consents is governed by state law, which lim-
its their use to either "unanimous written consents for an action" or by a majority
"assuming 100% attendance," id., which obviates the need for meetings. BALorrI
ET AL., supra note 103, § 5.4, at 56. Consents are actual votes while proxies are
authorizations to vote. Id. Despite the slight difference, consents are also included
within the generic definition of proxies. Id.
Omissions, such as inaction and "the failure to object or to dissent," 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-l(f) (1992), are also included within the definition of a proxy, consent, or
authorization. The inclusion of omissions in the definition of proxy broadens it
further, indicating that a formal vote, binding or otherwise legally effective, is not
a prerequisite for an action to be subject to SEC proxy regulation. Id. (citing Sar-
gent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 768 (5th Cir. 1974)). One commentator has
stated, "[t]he critical element of a proxy is collective or representative action by
shareholders." BALO'rI ET AL., supra note 103, § 5.4, at 55.
110. Zuckerman v. Franz, 573 F. Supp. 351, 357 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (holding that
the tender offer provision is intentionally vague to allow each situation to be re-
solved on its facts); Browning Debenture Holder's Committee v. DASA Corp., 524
F.2d 811, 816 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that the proxy rules must be construed
broadly to allow for the success of establishing private regulation of the securities
market); Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 514
F.2d 283 (2d Cir 1975) (holding that this section may not be read technically or
restrictively); Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 864 (D. Del.
1970) (holding the statute is remedial and must be construed broadly); Cattlemen's
Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (D. Okla. 1972) (holding that proxy
regulations in respect to tender offer filings must be read broadly to carry out the
legislative intent of the Securities Act which is a remedial statute).
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the definition of proxy is construed broadly to subject a wide
spectrum of possible situations to proxy regulation."'
IV. The SEC's 1992 Proxy Amendments
A. Overview
On October 16, 1992, after three years of debate, 112 four
congressional hearings," 3 consideration of comments made in
public forums," 4 two solicitation periods, 15 and review of a rec-
ord number of comment letters," 6 the Commission significantly
111. Id.
112. Debate within the Commission regarding the proxy rules commenced
with CalPERS letter in 1989 requesting 48 amendments to the proxy rules. Letter
from CalPERS to Linda C. Quinn, Director of the Division of Corporate Finance,
Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 3, 1989), in 1 22ND ANNUAL INSTITUTE
ON SECURITIES REGULATION 295 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 712, 1990).
113. 1992 Reproposal, supra note 24, at 950. However, the amount of congres-
sional analysis and research has been questioned. See House Interest in Proxy
Matters Provokes Corporate Response, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 20, 1992, at 5
(reporting that the Energy and Commerce's Telecommunication and Finance Com-
mittee which oversees the SEC has mainly been focusing on other matters, leaving
little time to grapple with the shareholder issues).
114. 1992 Reproposal, supra note 24, at 950. The Commission sponsored a
two-day public forum on March 18-19, 1992. A transcript of the public forum is on
file with the Washington, D.C. office of the Securities and Exchange Commission in
the Commission's public records room. Id. at 950 n.2.
115. 1991 Proposal, supra note 23, at 970 (soliciting public comment on the
1991 proposals); 1992 Reproposal, supra note 24, at 24 (soliciting comments on the
1992 proposals).
116. The 1991 proxy reform proposals drew more than 900 comment letters
from directors, academics, legislators, shareholders, lawyers, and other interested
groups. 1992 Reproposal, supra note 24, at 949-50. The second proposals drew an
additional 800 comment letters, for a record total of over 1,700 comment letters
from the public. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-2. The parties
responding to both of the Commission's comment solicitations represent some of
the largest financial interests in the United States. For example, comments were
filed on behalf of the Business Roundtable, representing more than 200 of the na-
tion's largest companies; The Investment Company Institute, representing over
3,800 investment companies with $1.42 trillion in assets; The Institutional Share-
holder Services Inc., the nation's leading proxy advisory firm; The American Soci-
ety of Corporate Secretaries, composed of more than 3,000 business executives;
United Shareholders Association, an organization of 60,000 members; Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., over 70 million shareholders; Phillips Petroleum; Merrill
Lynch; several state pension funds including CalPERS, the largest public retire-
ment fund; several insurance companies, including the Travelers; and The Ameri-
can Bar Association. The entire collection of letters is on file with the Commission
in its Washington, D.C., office's records room.
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revised its proxy regulations. 117 The Commission's amend-
ments specifically addressed the regulation of communications
with and among shareholders regarding management's per-
formance; elections and non-election issues; prefiling require-
ments for both registrants and shareholders; the presentation
of management's proposals; insurgent slate nominations; and
election contest reporting and filing - all important issues re-
lating to the shareholder's equity investment. 118 This section
117. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-1. Several of the pro-
posals included in both the Commission's 1991 proposal and the 1992 reproposal
were not included in the final amendments. Compare 1991 Proposal and 1992
Reproposal with 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at Part II(J). The
most significant of these was the shareholder analysis of the management per-
formance proposed by Edward Regan. Letter from Edward V. Regan, Comptroller
of the State of New York, to Richard Breeden, Chairman Securities and Exchange
Commission (March 18, 1992) (on file with the SEC). Under this proposal, a regis-
trant would have been required to include a 700-word statement "expressing views
on the performance of the company, its management and the board of directors" by
certain long-term investors in the corporation's annual proxy statement relating to
the election of directors. Id. To be eligible to submit such statements, a person
must have held at least one-half of one percent of the registrant's stock for at least
three years. Id. Management would have been permitted to respond. Id.
Critics stated that the proposal was "extreme and riddled with ambiguities"
and that proxy forms "should not be transformed into a forum for general com-
ments." Letter from Cravath, Swaine & Moore to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 7 (Aug. 27, 1992) (on file with the SEC); Robert A. Kindler & Rachel
R. Gerstenhaber, Shareholder Initiatives, Institutional Investors and the SEC:
14A-8 Proposals and the New Proxy Rules, in 2 24TH ANNUAL INSTrITE ON SECuRi-
TIEs REGULATION 15, 79 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Handbook Series No. 755,
1992). Criticism was also centered on the additional expense, length and complex-
ity this amendment would add to the proxy statement. Letter from the Business
Roundtable to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 (Aug. 28, 1992) (on file
with the SEC). Furthermore, the SEC's authority to require the inclusion of share-
holder opinions in corporate proxy statements was questioned. Id. The Business
Roundtable analogized that "[slection 14(a)... clearly does not authorize the Com-
mission to adopt a rule requiring corporations to reimburse dissident shareholders
for their solicitation expenses, and the Commission cannot achieve the same ends
by requiring the inclusion of such solicitation materials in the corporate proxy
statement at corporate expense.' Id. at 18.
The Commission rationalized that the other amended rules now afford share-
holders ample opportunity to communicate their view to other shareholders and,
therefore, found this proposal to be unnecessary and excluded it from the 1992
final proxy amendments. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-18.
118. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-1. Concurrent with
its promulgation of the proxy rule amendments, the SEC has amended reporting
requirements to enhance the disclosure of executive's compensation. Id. at S-27.
The new compensation rules substitute a series of executive compensation ta-
bles in the annual corporate statement for the narrative both required previously.
Id. The amendments seek to improve disclosure clarity of executive compensation.
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will discuss the proxy rules prior to amendment with respect to
each of these topics, the perceived inadequacies under these
rules, and the SEC's 1992 Amendments.
B. SEC's 1992 Proxy Amendments: Shareholder
Communication Provisions
1. Regulation of Shareholder Communications Under
The Old Rules
The basic framework for proxy regulation under the new
rules remains the same; only the exceptions have changed.
Proxy rules are triggered when a party solicits or permits the
use of his name to solicit proxies addressed to shareholders of
eligible securities. 119 No solicitations can be made "unless each
party solicited [was] concurrently furnished... with a... writ-
ten proxy statement containing the information specified in
Schedule 14A."120 The purpose of the proxy statement is to suf-
See generally SEC Adopts Proxy Reform After Long Study, 61 U.S.L.W. (BNA) 2234
(Oct. 27, 1992) (discussing the new executive compensation rules).
The executive compensation amendments are applicable to proxy and informa-
tion statements, registration statements, and periodic reports under the Exchange
Act and to registration amendments and statements under the Securities Act.
1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-27.
119. Eligible securities are securities which are traded on national exchanges.
Additionally, this limitation of the proxy rules' application removes smaller compa-
nies, even if publicly traded, from compliance with the panoply of the federal secur-
ities laws. Before the 1992 amendments, this limitation exempted securities held
by less than 500 record owners or corporations with assets less than five million
dollars. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12(g)(1)(A)-(B) (1992). While federal rules may exempt
these securities, some exchanges require, as a precondition to listing, similar com-
pliance with proxy rules. See, e.g., NASDAQ (requiring all issuers traded on NAS-
DAQ exchange to list under § 12). Furthermore, these rules do not apply to
"certain foreign, insurance, exempt securities or debt securities not traded on an
exchange." BALO'rI ET AL., supra note 103, § 5.3, at 54-55.
120. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a) (1992). Schedule 14A requires the soliciting
party to disclose and describe: (1) the revocability of the proxy; (2) dissenter's ap-
praisal rights; (3) the identity of both the soliciting party and party bearing the
solicitation costs; and (4) the soliciting party's interests in the voting matter. Id.
§ 240.14a-101. The Schedule requires additional disclosure for election contests
and shareholder proposals. Id. For example, if the solicitation relates to the elec-
tion of directors and is issued by the registrant, the registrant must issue an an-
nual report with the proxy statement. Id. § 240.14a-3.
Annual reports contain a balance sheet, an income statement, a statement of
changes in financial position, other explanatory notes, the auditor's report and
other comments from management including future prospects. J. FRED WESTON &
EUGENE F. BRIGHAM, ESSENTIALS OF MANAGERIAL FINANCE 226 (8th ed. 1987). The
requirements for the annual statement were designed to inform the shareholder in
488
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ficiently inform shareholders to enable them to make informed
decisions on the voting of their shares.121 Furthermore, all
soliciting materials, including the proxy statement, must be
filed with the SEC ten days before they are used.122 Therefore,
whether a party is embroiled in the morass of securities regula-
tion depends upon the definition of a "solicitation." 23
The Commission defines "solicitations" as communications
"reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withhold-
ing or revocation of a proxy."124 One case has extended the defi-
nition of solicitation to any event which is part of "a continuous
plan ending in solicitation and which prepares the way for its
success."125 This means that communications made when a per-
an "easily understood manner." Securities Act Release No. 6176 [1979-1980], Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,422 (Jan. 15, 1980).
121. See, e.g., 4 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 1936 n.36.
122. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(a) (1992). Copies of such materials, in the form of
'speeches, press releases and radio and television scripts," may optionally be filed
with the SEC. Id. § 240.14a-6(h). However, there is a risk that the Commission
will require a corrective disclosure for a party who takes advantage of this privi-
lege; it is, therefore, an expensive risk. Loss, supra note 33, at 460.
123. Often, determinations of whether a "solicitation" has been made are re-
quired before any formal proxy statements have been filed with the SEC. Thomas
A. Cole, Proxy Rules and Proxy Reform Issues, in 2 23RD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
SECURITIEs REGULATION 637, 673 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 755, 1992). During this pre-filing period, "both management and insur-
gents may seek to canvass shareholder attitudes via informal communications."
Id.
124. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(lX1)(iii) (1992). The definition states:
(1) Solicitation. The terms "solicit" and "solicitation" include:
(i) Any request for a proxy whether or not accompanied by or included in a
form of proxy; (ii) Any request to execute or not to execute, or to revoke, a
proxy; or (iii) The furnishing of a form of proxy or other communication to
security holders under circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the
procurement, withholding or revocation of a proxy.
Id. § 240.14a-l(l)(1)(i)-(iii). The defined terms do not apply to "the furnishing of a
form of proxy to a security holder upon the unsolicited request of such security
holder, the performance by the registrant of acts required by Rule 14a-7, or the
performance by any person of ministerial acts on behalf of a person soliciting a
proxy." Id. § 240.14a-l(l)(2)(i)-(iii).
125. SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1943). In Okin, the defendant
mailed letters to the shareholders urging them not to sign proxies for the company.
Id. The court held the letter was a solicitation and that to hold otherwise would
'circumvent the statute" and Congressional intent. Id. Therefore, "[t]he earlier
stages in the execution of... a continuous purpose must be subject to regulation."
Id. See also Transworld Corp. v. Odyssey Partners, 561 F. Supp. 1315 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (holding that a communication does not need to expressly request a proxy if
it is "part of a continuous plan to end in solicitation").
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son was not even considering a formal proxy solicitation might
ultimately be found to be a part of a continuous plan under-
taken in violation of the proxy rules since proxy materials were
not filed with the SEC.
The question is, therefore, whether a communication based
upon the totality of the circumstances is "reasonably calculated"
to influence the shareholders' votes. 126 In examining the total-
ity of the circumstances, the purpose of the solicitation must be
assessed. 127 Purpose depends on the "nature of the communica-
tion and the circumstances under which it was distributed." 28
For example, not every communication to shareholders
qualifies as a solicitation. 29 In one case, a newspaper commu-
nication not reasonably calculated to result in the procurement
of proxies was not a solicitation under section 14 of the Ex-
change Act. 30 On the other hand, a solicitation does not need to
be directly "targeted" at a shareholder.' 3 ' Speeches, press re-
Judge Learned Hand's decision in Okin is widely cited by commentators be-
cause it concisely expresses the breadth of the term solicitation. 4 Loss & SELIG-
MAN, supra note 17, at 1936-45; BALLOTI ET AL, supra note 103, § 5.5, at 57;
MICHAEL D. WATERS, PROXY REGULATION 12-13 (1992). The opinion related the
following passage:
[T]he complaint presents the question whether the power of the Commission
... is limited to the regulation of a proxy, power of attorney, consent, or
authorization, strictly as such; or whether it extends to any writings which
are part of a continuous plan ending in solicitation and which prepare the
way for its success. We have no doubt that the power extends to such writ-
ings; were it not so, an easy way would be open to circumvent the statute;
one need only spread the misinformation adequately before beginning to so-
licit, and the Commission would be powerless to protect shareholders.
Okin, 132 F.2d at 786.
126. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 1985)
(stating "[tihe question in every case is whether the challenged communication,
seen in the totality of the circumstances, is 'reasonably calculated' to influence
shareholder votes").
127. BALOTri ET AL., supra note 103, § 5.5, at 57 (citing Long Island Lighting
Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1985)).
128. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 1985)
(citing Brown v. Chicago Rock Island & Pacific R.R., 328 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1964)).
129. Brown v. Chicago Rock Island & Pacific R.R., 328 F.2d 122, 125 (7th Cir.
1964) (holding that a newspaper ad was not a communication to shareholders rea-
sonably calculated to result in procurement of proxies and, therefore, not an un-
lawful proxy solicitation).
130. Id.
131. Long Island Lighting Co., 779 F.2d at 796 (citing Rule 14a-6(g); 17 C.F.R.
§ 14a-6(g) (1992)).
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leases, and television scripts are required to be filed with the
SEC in order to prevent "easy evasion" of the proxy regula-
tions. 132 This is true even in instances where the solicitation
concerns matters that are political in nature or in the "public
interest."133 Furthermore, solicitations intended to acquire fu-
ture proxies are within the ambit of the proxy rules.'3 ' These
interpretations illustrate that the SEC has defined "solicitation"
in the same broad manner as "proxy."
Under the old rules there were two tiers of exemptions.
Tier one exemptions were spelled out in Rule 14a-1 and were for
certain garden variety acts such as a newspaper advertisement
advising a shareholder where he may obtain soliciting mate-
rial. 35 Solicitations under this exemption were not subject to
any of the proxy rules including the anti-fraud provision.
36
Tier two exemptions allowed a shareholder to communicate
with ten other shareholders before becoming subject to the
proxy rules. 37 However, this exemption was subject to the anti-
fraud provision in Rule 14a-9.138
Once identified as a solicitation, a communication must
either be preceded or accompanied by a proxy statement. 139 A
proxy statement is a written statement containing information
required by regulation to be given to shareholders as a prereq-
uisite to solicitation. 140 The cost of this mailing is often so im-
mense, that for an individual investor the cost far outweighs
any benefits the individual investor will receive.' 4 '
132. Id.
133. Id. (quoting Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 667
(D.C. Cir. 1970)).
134. Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 694 (2d Cir. 1966). In Stude-
baker, the defendant solicited authorizations from shareholders to obtain share-
holder lists from the corporation in the course of a proxy fight. Id. The court held
that the authorizations were only sought for the purpose of seeking future proxies,
and, hence, were covered by the proxy rules. Id.
135. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(a)(6) (1992).
136. Id. § 240.14a-2(a).
137. Id. § 240.14a-2(b)(1).
138. Id. § 240.14a-2(b).
139. Id. § 240.14a-3(a).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The proxy statement and its con-
tents are one of the focal points of the proxy solicitation process under § 14(a).
141. See 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-4 (recognizing
that the mailing costs alone could exceed hundreds of thousands of dollars).
1994]
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2. Perceived Problems in the Regulation of Shareholder
Communication
In the last several years, the federal proxy system has
achieved heightened significance as a method of gaining corpo-
rate control. In the past decade, markets for corporate control
were driven by corporate raiders or management, making coer-
cive tender offers fueled by junk bonds. Currently, junk bond
markets have dried up. Tender offers have virtually evaporated
and both state corporate law and corporate boards have erected
significant barriers to hostile takeovers. 142 The new economic
landscape and rise of the institutional investor, coupled with
the past success of shareholder activists, however limited, cre-
ate an environment amenable to proxy contests. 143 In the
1990s, the weapon in the fight for corporate control will be de-
bate, not debt.'"
In the case of any communication declared a solicitation that is disseminated
in the market, all shareholders are deemed solicited. Cf BALorri ET AL., supra
note 103, § 5.5, at 57-58.
142. Jonathan Peterson, Junk Bonds: A Revolt that Failed Wall Street: The
Economic Highlights of The 1980's Growing Economy Are A Peril in the Downturn
of the '90s, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1990, at Al. As one commentator observed, "[tihe
legacy of the 1980's [sic] is mainly a financial one-manifested in the bankruptcy
of Drexel Burnham Lambert, the imprisonment of Michael Milken and Ivan Bo-
esky, and the retreat of corporate raiders." POUND, supra note 11, at 92.
143. During the 1991 proxy season, corporate governance issues dominated
the agenda. But as of June 1992, the number of corporate governance proposals
had dropped from the 1991 high. Fewer Governance Proposals Seen in '92; Tactic
of Opposing Board Slates Emerges, Corporate Counsel Wkly. (BNA) 2 (June 17,
1992). The decrease was not attributed to decreased activism; to the contrary, it
was attributed to increased activism and success in "behind-the-scenes diplomacy."
Id. Since the institutional investors achieved such success in influencing corporate
governance via shareholder proposals, they have achieved a new status and, also,
have discovered that many companies are now willing to negotiate with them. In-
stitutions May Use Negotiations More in 1992 to Change Corporate Governance, 24
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 13 (Jan. 3, 1992).
Shareholder activism has also begun to emerge in Europe and Asia. Andrew
Sollinger, Global Custody; Voter's Rights, INSTrrTIONAL INVESTOR, Nov. 1991, at
160. Currently, in countries in these regions, it is very difficult to vote your shares.
For example, in France share votes must be cast in person or by a third-party
agent unaffiliated with management at the shareholder meeting. Id. In response,
numerous global proxy services have been established to vote proxy shares. Id.
144. Pound, supra note 11, at 83. Professor Pound notes that there are sev-
eral political vehicles which may be utilized to effectuate change on corporate gov-
ernance issues. Id. He cites shadow management committees, independent
director slates, outside expert directors, shareholder committees, proxy campaigns.
Id. at 83-84. In his article, Professor Pound discusses several examples of corpora-
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As the chapter ends on the corporate raider, another power-
ful suitor comes to the forefront: the institutional investor. The
institutional investor, due to vast collective holdings, wields the
power in this new environment to effectuate corporate change.
Furthermore, with the decline in merger activity, institutions
are looking for the high returns they received in the 1980s. In-
stitutions can realize higher returns by participating in the
management of companies in which they own stock.
Before the recently enacted reform, the federal proxy sys-
tem impeded institutional investors from bidding for corporate
control. 145 As a result, the proxy rules became the subject of
much criticism for their shortcomings in relation to corporate
governance issues. 46 Both critics and the Commission have
agreed that the federal proxy rules prior to their amendment
"create[d] unnecessary regulatory impediments to communica-
tion among shareholders and others to the effective use of
shareholder voting rights." 47 Moreover, proponents of reform
argue that the proxy rules have diminished the role of the
tions where these newly politicized methods for corporate control are utilized. Id.
at 85, 89. He concludes these new methods are in the best interests of corporate
America and are "in tune... with the dictates of the American governance ideal."
Id. at 93.
145. In their seminal work, Berle and Means noted in 1932 that professional
managers had disenfranchised shareholders via the proxy machinery. BERLE &
MEANS, supra note 75, at 81-88. In 1957, Professor Berle characterized the share-
holder meeting as "a kind of ancient meaningless ritual." ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.,
ECONOMIC POWER AND THE FREE SOCIETY 7 (1957).
146. See, e.g., Letter from CalPERS, to Linda C. Quinn, Director of the Divi-
sion of Corporate Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 3, 1989) in
1 22ND ANNUAL INsTrUTE ON SECuRTiEs REGULATION 298, 298 (PLI Corp. Law
and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 712, 1990) ("[t]he proxy system repre-
sents the primary medium through which the dialogue of corporate governance,
between shareholders and the public companies they own, is conducted.... [and]
[d]espite marked changes in shareholder demographics in the last two decades, the
distribution of share ownership remains widespread, and the proxy process is the
principle means by which outside shareholders can play an ongoing and meaning-
ful role in the governance of publicly held entities"). See also John Pound, After
Takeovers, Quiet Diplomacy, WALL ST. J., June 8, 1992, at A10 (supporting change
in corporate governance through the proxy system); Myron Magnet, Directors
Wake Up!, FORTUNE, June 15, 1992, at 85 (reporting the ineffective cultures that
have developed in corporate board rooms).
147. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-2. See also Letter
from CalPERS, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (July 29, 1992) (agreeing with the Commission that the rules "create
unnecessary regulatory impediments to free and open shareholder communication
and effective use of the shareholder franchise, and that change is necessary").
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shareholder in corporate governance and serve to "suffocate
shareholder input or insulate management." 148 Suppressing
shareholder communication removes management from the
scrutiny of the shareholders, the owners of the corporation. The
broad definition of "solicitation" created a significant chilling ef-
fect on shareholder communication. 149 Institutional investors,
fearful of being found after the fact to have triggered the pano-
ply of securities laws and stringent regulatory provisions, have
refrained from voicing opinions or communicating with other
shareholders without extensive prefiling. 150
The Commission has stated that "modifications in the cur-
rent rules are desirable to reduce these burdens and to achieve
the purpose set forth in the Exchange Act,"' 5' to assure "fair,
informed, and effective shareholder suffrage."'5 2 In 1990, react-
ing to the perceived shortcomings of the proxy system and the
changing shareholder demographics, the Commission under-
took its own comprehensive review of the proxy rules. 53
3. Amendments to Rule 14a-2: A New Exemption from
the Proxy Regulations
The SEC's first amendment was to Rule 14a-2(b)(1), 54
which exempts certain disinterested solicitations from proxy
Critics also argued that "[t]he proxy rules in their present form have evolved
and been shaped by an environment that reflects an underlying philosophy of pro-
tecting registrants from shareholder involvement." Letter from CalPERS, to
Linda C. Quinn, Director of the Division of Corporate Finance, Securities and Ex-
change Commission (Nov. 3, 1989) in 1 22ND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 295, 304 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No.
712, 1990).
148. Letter from CaIPERS, to Linda C. Quinn, Director of the Division of Cor-
porate Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 3, 1989) in 1 22ND
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 295, 304 (PLI Corp. Law and Prac-
tice Course Handbook Series No. 712, 1990).
149. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-4.
150. Id. at S-3 to S-4.
151. Id. at S-2.
152. 1991 Proposal, supra note 23, at 950. See also H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 14 (1934) (discussing the importance of fair and effective share-
holder suffrage).
153. Letter from CalPERS to the Securities and Exchange Commission 5
(Aug. 25, 1992) (on file with the SEC).
154. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-1.
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regulation.155 This amendment was the most debated and con-
troversial proposal during the solicitation period. 156 The
amendment adds a new exemption from the provisions of all of
the proxy rules except Rule 14a-9,157 the proxy rules' anti-fraud
provision. Solicitations conducted by persons who are not seek-
ing proxy authority and do not have a substantial interest in
the subject matter of the vote are no longer regulated by the
proxy rules.'58 Such "disinterested parties" are absolutely free
to communicate with other shareholders either orally or in writ-
ing without becoming entangled in the morass of the proxy
regulations.159
Under the exemption, all oral communications are excluded
from proxy regulation and filing is only required for certain
written solicitations. 60 This amendment lies at the heart of the
Commission's reforms, which seek to "promot[e] free discussion,
debate and learning among shareholders" and not "plac[e] re-
straints on that process."' 6 '
The exclusion of oral communications in both the Commis-
sion's 1991 proposal and the 1992 reproposal drew serious criti-
155. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2 (1992). The SEC never changed the definition of
"solicitation;" it merely created certain exemptions and a safe harbor.
156. 1992 Reproposal, supra note 24, at 951.
157. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1992).
158. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-19. The amendments
do not apply to the following:
[any solicitation by or on behalf of any person who does not, at any time
during such solicitation, seek directly or indirectly, either on its own or an-
other's behalf, the power to act as proxy for a security holder and does not
furnish or otherwise request, or act on behalf of a person who furnishes or
requests, a form of revocation, abstention, consent or authorization.
Id. at S-19 to S-20.
159. Id. at S-6. The Business Roundtable does not oppose this amendment.
However, Co-chairman H. Brewster Atwater, Jr., does warn that:
[we don't want the SEC to regulate conversations between small sharehold-
ers at the company picnic, but we do think that the large institutional share-
holders with big enough holdings to influence the outcome of a proxy contest
are soliciting shareholder votes, the rest of the shareholders have a right
and need to know about it.
Management, Institutions Agree Reforms Will Shape '93 Season, ISSUE ALERT 1.
(Institutional Shareholders Services, Inc. ed., 1992).
160. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-6.
161. Id. at S-5.
1994] 495
37
496 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:459
cism from the business community. 162 Due to the increased size
of the institutional investor, the business community was con-
cerned about "secret back-room lobbying" between institutional
investors. 16 3 They also cited the frequency of oral communica-
tion as the manner in which most solicitations occurred. 16 As a
safeguard, however, these communications are subject to the
anti-fraud provisions. Therefore, fraudulent speech under this
exemption can be attacked in a lawsuit by management or other
shareholders. 165
162. See, e.g., Letter from H. Brewster Atwater, co-chairman, Business
Roundtable, to the Securities and Exchange Commission 2 (Sept. 18, 1992) (on file
with the SEC) (suggesting the imposition of a 5% ownership to remain regulated);
Letter from Robert E. Healing, Corporate Counsel, General Electric to the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, 4 (Aug. 28, 1992) (on file with the SEC) (contend-
ing these amendments subvert disclosure principles); Letter from David H.
Knutson, Associate Secretary, Chase Manhattan Corp. to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, 2 (Aug. 28, 1992) (on file with the SEC) ("[olral solicitation
should not be exempt... [tihis would frustrate disclosure, subvert proposed Notice
Form 14 and drive or attract solicitation activities"); Letter from Richard H. Troy,
Chairman, American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc., to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (Aug. 4, 1992) (on file with the SEC) (arguing against al-
lowing unregulated oral solicitations).
163. Letter from the Business Roundtable to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (Sept. 18, 1991) (on fie with the SEC).
164. Id.
165. The existence of a private right of action under § 14a-9 is well settled.
Roosevelt v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 418-25 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
This rule prohibits the following:
[n]o solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any
proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication,
written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in the light
of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with
respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading or nec-
essary to correct any statement in any earlier communication with respect
to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which
has become false or misleading.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1993).
One commentator noted that Rule 14a-9 "has probably been one of the most
frequently litigated provisions in the federal securities statutes." WATERS, supra
note 125, at 316. Parties have litigated whether a private action exists, whether
the plaintiff has standing, who is liable, whether there was causation, and, at the
heart of the rule, whether the misleading or false statements were "material." Id.
at 317-77.
This rule is broadly applied and is similar to the SEC's Rule 10b-5 which ap-
plies to fraud in the purchase or sale of a security. Unlike Rule 10b-5, if liability is
established money damages are rarely awarded; relief is instead equitable and
comes in the form of injunctive relief, a corrective disclosure, or a re-solicitation
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Written materials are also exempted from proxy regulation.
In contrast to oral communications, however, this exemption is
subject to three significant conditions.166 The three new provi-
sions were added in response to the great deal of controversy
concerning the SEC's distinction between written and oral
solicitations. 167
The first condition requires that beneficial owners of more
than $5 million of a company's securities file written notice168
with the SEC. 169 The second condition requires that those who
are required to file, i.e., owners of $5 million or more of a secur-
ity, must do so within three days after the solicitation material
order of the proxies. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964)
(finding that federal jurisdiction existed to grant all necessary remedial relief);
Telvest, Inc. v. Wisconsin Real Estate Inv. Trust, 489 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Wis.),
modified, 781 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986) (ordering a corrective disclosure). But see
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389 (1970) (awarding damages but
"only to the extent that they can be shown").
166. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-7. The SEC's original
proposal exempted all solicitations for the proxy regulations, including written
communications. 1991 Proposal, supra note 23, at 975. See also 1992 Final Proxy
Amendments, supra note 21, at S-6 (discussing the reversal of the SEC's position
on written solicitations). In the final amendments, the SEC retreated from their
initial position of complete exemption for all oral and written communications, to
require filing of written solicitations for certain large shareholders. Id. at S-6. The
SEC reported that much of the controversy in response to the reproposal centered
on the SEC's distinction between oral and written communications. Id.
167. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-7.
168. The contents of the notice required to be filed include, the name and ad-
dress of the party relying on the exemption, the name of the registrant, and identi-
fication of the written soliciting materials that are materially different. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-103 (1993). The United States Supreme Court concluded that in the
proxy solicitation context "[a]n omitted fact is material if there is substantial likeli-
hood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote." TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
169. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(g)(1) (1993). The dollar amount required to trigger
the statute, as required by the final amendments, currently $5 million, will be ad-
justed annually to account for inflation. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra
note 21, at S-8. The adjustment will be calculated by multiplying the $5 million
threshold by the Consumer Price Annual Average for All Items Index for All Urban
Consumers (CPI-U). Id. The updated dollar threshold figure will be announced at
the beginning of each year. Id.
The $5 million limitation was adopted from a comment letter. See 1992 Final
Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-6. The SEC did not adopt another sugges-
tion which would have required a soliciting party and a party solicited who own
more than 5% of the company's shares to file any oral communication made be-
tween themselves with the Commission. See id.
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is given to the shareholders. 170 The SEC emphasizes that the
purpose of the notice is to bring the information into the public
domain and, thus, it is not a disclosure document subject to
SEC liability. 171 Finally, the third condition extends the law to
both officers and directors who are soliciting proxies without
use of corporate funds.172
The new exemption from the proxy rules provided in Rule
14-a-2 provides a list of interested persons who can not rely on
the exemption. 73 The list includes individuals classified as in-
siders, 174 competing bidders, 75 certain financially interested
170. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(g)(1) (1993). Once received by the SEC, the new
notice form will be publicly available. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note
21, at S-8. The time period was reduced because of concern about what would
transpire during the interim waiting period. Id. Persons required to submit a no-
tice filing must send copies of the materials to the SEC and any national exchange
on which the securities are listed within three days of the date of dissemination of
the materials. Id. The Commission expressed that any "concerns about less so-
phisticated shareholders that gave rise to the ten day period have been mitigated,"
by the fact that the notice requirement only applies to large shareholders. Id.
171. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-8. Certain communi-
cations are exempt from the notice filing regardless of the solicitor's size. These
are as follows: speeches in a public forum; press releases; and published or broad-
cast opinions, statements, or advertisements. Id. at S-9. These communications
are all publicly made and, thus, are already in the public domain. Id. However,
press releases that are not disseminated by a news service are not exempt unless
they are not disseminated to any other shareholder. Id. In the situation where a
shareholder employs a company to telephone shareholders and read communica-
tions from a script, these communications are deemed written communications
and may qualify as a written solicitation under the amendments' provisions. Id.
172. Id. at S-7.
173. The original proposal, only listed in a note, provides four examples of
persons who could not qualify as under this exemption. 1991 Proposal, supra note
23, at 983. The reproposal provided the following synopsis of the proposal's initial
text:
a. an affiliate, officer or director of the issuer or an ineligible party; b. a
competing bidder; c. an interested person of a registered investment com-
pany; d. a person who receives compensation directly or indirectly from any
of the above; and e. a person acting on behalf of a person soliciting proxy
authority or who is otherwise ineligible.
1992 Reproposal, supra note 24, at 954.
174. This classification includes the registrant or an affiliate or associate of
the registrant; an officer or director of the registrant or anyone serving in a similar
capacity; an officer, director, affiliate or associate of a person not entitled to an
exemption within this subsection; and any nominee for directorship for which
proxies are being solicited. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1)(i)-(iv) (1993). When applied
to corporate inside personnel, the rules permit exemption when the person con-
ducts the proxy at his own personal expense. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments,
supra note 21, at S-7. This classification also disqualifies "[amny person who is re-
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parties, 176 registered investment companies, 177 and agents of
any ineligible person.178 These categories were not permitted to
take advantage of the exemption due to the inherent potential
for abuse their situations impose. 179
4. Amendments to Rules 14a-1 and 14a-3: Exemption for
Certain Media Communications
As noted above, the definition of "solicitation" in the proxy
regulations directly affects whether or not a communication is
regulated by these rules. 80 Historically, the definition of solici-
tation in the rules is written in broad language and likewise has
been given a broad interpretation by the courts.' 8' In order to
exempt certain communications from falling within the defini-
tion of solicitation and the subsequent purview of the proxy
rules, the Commission has created a "safe harbor" from the defi-
nition of solicitation for certain shareholder communications. 8 2
The safe harbor permits public announcements of a share-
holder's voting intentions and/or voting rationale by specifically
quired to report beneficial ownership of the registrant's equity securities on a
Schedule 13D . . . ." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1)(vi) (1993). In essence, this
removes a parent corporation from the exception regarding solicitation of subsidi-
ary corporation proxies.
175. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1)(v) (1993). This section excludes:
[a]ny person soliciting in opposition to a merger, recapitalization, reorgani-
zation, sale of assets or other extraordinary transaction recommended or
approved by the board of directors of the registrant who is proposing or in-
tends to propose an alternative transaction to which such person or one of
its affiliates is a party.
Id. § 240.14a-2(b)(1)(v).
176. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1)(ix) (1993). This section requires that the fi-
nancial interest be one which "would not be shared pro rata by all other holders of
the same class of securities, other than a benefit arising from the person's employ-
ment with the registrant. . . ." Id. A person who receives compensation from an
ineligible person is also exempted. See id.
177. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1)(viii) (1993). This exception includes "inter-
ested person" as defined by § 2(a)(19) of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Id.
178. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1)(x) (1993).
179. See 1991 Proposal, supra note 23, at 953-55.
180. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
181. See supra part IV.B.1.
182. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-9. All announce-
ments not qualifying for safe harbor protection are still subject to a determination
under the definition provided by the rules as to whether or not they are solicita-
tions. Id.
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excluding such public statements from the definition of solicita-
tion in Rule 14a-1. 183 This amendment, therefore, allows share-
holders to publicly announce how they intend to vote and
183. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-9. Before the amend-
ments, there were several exemptions from the definition of solicitation. Any solic-
itation by record owners to beneficial owners, i.e., a solicitation by a broker to the
shareholder, and vice versa, were exempt from proxy regulation. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-2(a)(1)-(2) (1992). Furthermore, instances where a security purchaser
wishes to "solicit and obtain the seller's proxy" when the sale occurs after the rec-
ord date were exempt from proxy filing. 4 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 17, at
1956. See also id. at 1956 n.97 (discussing at what point a buyer of a security
becomes a beneficial owner, especially when the sale is contingent on a buyer's
contractual duty to perform).
Solicitations involved in the selling of securities registered under the Securi-
ties Act were also exempted from proxy regulation. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(a)(3)
(1992). The caveat to this exemption is that it does not apply to securities to be
issued in either a reclassification of securities, merger, consolidation, or a transfer
of assets. Id. These are all transactions of the character specified in paragraph (a)
of Rule 145 of the Securities Act. These transactions do not, however, escape regu-
lation; they are required to comply with regulations 14A and 14C under Form S-4.
Again, this exemption eliminates duplicative filing. WATERS, supra note 125, at
31.
The Rule also contained an exemption which parallels the "tombstone ad" ex-
emption in the Securities Act. Compare 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 466-
77 with 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(a)(6) (1992). Tombstone ads are newspaper adver-
tisements and inform security holders where they may obtain proxy soliciting ma-
terial. WATERS, supra note 125, at 31. They "may only name the registrant, state
the reason for the advertisement, and identify the proposal to be acted upon by the
security holder." Id. The purpose of allowing these ads is to reach beneficial own-
ers who have not responded to soliciting materials.
Other solicitations exempted include those related to 1978 Bankruptcy Reform
Act Chapter 11 reorganization (as amended) and solicitations connected with the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(a)(4)-(5)
(1992). The rationale behind these exemptions is avoidance of duplicative regula-
tion. 4 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 1955.
Furthermore, Rule 14a-2 limited rule 14a-2(b)(1) and 14a-2(b)(2) of its pre-
amendment exemptions to exemption from all proxy regulations except the anti-
fraud provision. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b) (1992). Rule 14a-2(b)(1) exempts non-
registrant solicitation for groups of less than ten shareholders. Id. § 240.14a-
2(b)(1). See 4 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 1957-58. Under this rule,
whether or not a proxy is granted is of no consequence. Id. It is the number of
solicitations that affects the exemption. Id. Rule 14a-2(b)(2) exempts solicitation
by one person in the form of advice "in the ordinary course of his business." 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(2)(i) (1992). Under the 14a(b)(2) exemption, an advisor can-
not receive payment from anyone except the "recipient(s)" of the advice, and must
fully disclose any relationship with the registrants and any other possibly conflict-
ing interests of the recipient. Id. § 240.14a-2(b)(2)(ii)-(iii) (1992). Similarly, the
advisor cannot be acting "on behalf" of individuals soliciting proxies or participat-
ing in a Rule 14a-11 election. Id. § 240.14a-2(b)(2)(iv).
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why.184 Hence, this is a very effective and inexpensive way to
communicate with other shareholders. 185 Moreover, announce-
ment of opposition or support for either management or insur-
gent nominees is likely to have a significant effect on other
shareholders, particularly announcements by large institu-
tions. 186 Additionally, the new safe harbor exempts the public
announcement from all proxy rules, including Rule 14a-9, and
does not restrict the number of releases or times the announce-
ments can be made. 187
The exemption also applies to an unsolicited communica-
tion in response to information requested by another share-
holder 88 and any communications by a fiduciary to its
beneficiaries explaining how it intends to vote the proxies. 89
Moreover, officers and directors who are shareholders are per-
mitted to take advantage of the safe harbor. 90
In a similar amendment, the Commission amended Rule
14a-3 to facilitate the use of the media in shareholder communi-
184. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-1, S-9.
185. All an investor would have to do is draft a press release and fax it to the
press.
186. This is evident from the massive public campaign for the shareholder
approval or disapproval of the Centel/Sprint merger which was approved by a nar-
row margin of 1% over strong institutional lobbying to the contrary. Fran Haw-
thorne, What The New SEC Rules Do For Activism, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr.
1993, at 47, 48. Eagle Asset Management took advantage of the safe harbor to
vote with management in favor of the merger. Id.
187. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-9. The provision was
adopted over strong corporate protest. The Business Roundtable strongly urged
that this exemption should be limited to a one-time announcement. Letter from
the Business Roundtable to the Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 28,
1992) (on file with the SEC). Multiple announcements would be solely utilized for
the purpose of influencing shareholders, regardless of the stated purpose. Id. Cur-
rently, the exemption would "permit a shareholder, for example, to publish news-
paper advertisements on a daily basis, arguments favoring one side or another in
an election or other proxy contest, free from any oversight under the proxy rules."
Id.
188. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(1)(2)(iv)(C) (1993).
189. Id. § 240.14a-1(1)(2)(iv)(B). This amendment also drew criticism from the
Business Roundtable. Letter from the Business Roundtable to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (Aug. 28, 1992) (on file with the SEC). By exemption from
this rule, the Roundtable contended that the amendment would leave "neither the
Commission nor other interested parties any recourse against a shareholder who
makes a public announcement containing intentionally false and fraudulent state-
ments of even highly material facts." Id.
190. Id.
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cation. Rule 14a-3, as amended, no longer requires the delivery
of a proxy statement to every shareholder for certain forums of
communication. Forums listed in the amended rule include:
"communication[s] made by means of speeches in public forums,
press releases, published or broadcast opinions, statements, or
advertisements appearing in a broadcast media, newspaper,
magazine or other bona fide publication disseminated on a regu-
lar basis."191 The new rules are, however, subject to two condi-
tions: no form of proxy, consent, or authorization accompanies
the public communication, 192 and a definitive proxy must be on
file with the Commission at the time the communication is
made. 193 These revisions purport to reduce the potentially im-
mense costs of filing and revitalize the use of the public media
in proxy contests. 94
5. Amendments to Rule 14a-7: Shareholder Lists
The amended rules permit the registrant, the corporation
registered with the SEC, upon receipt of a written request' 95 for
191. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(f) (1993). Before the amendment, these communi-
cations were not exempt by any provision of the rules, rather they fell within the
definition of "solicitation" and required filing.
192. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(f)(1) (1993).
193. Id. § 240.14a-3(f)(2).
194. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-10. This amendment
also balances the proxy system because prior to amendment, the corporation could
make public comments about the insurgent, and hold press conferences while in-
surgents would be required to file, and mail all shareholders a proxy card before
they could speak. See, e.g., Joel Chernoff, SEC Seeks to Ease Proxy Communica-
tion, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTs, July 6, 1992, at 17 (noting that Bob Monk probably
would have prevailed in a constitutional challenge to the SEC's current rules).
Under this system an insurgent couldn't even rebut management, answer ques-
tions raised by the media nor defend their position without incurring significant
costs.
195. All that is necessary to trigger the registrant's obligations is for the
shareholder to make a written request for either a shareholder list or mailing of
their soliciting material. 1992 Reproposal, supra note 24, at 959. The written re-
quests for shareholder lists will remain non-public information. Id. The Commis-
sion abandoned a proposal to require disclosure of requests for shareholder lists
"as of the date" of proxy or information statement distribution. 1992 Final Proxy
Amendments, supra note 21, at S-15. The implications of unfair action on the reg-
istrant's part influenced the Commission's rejection of this proposed amendment.
Id.
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a shareholder list by a record holder or a beneficial owner 196
either to:
(1) provide a requesting shareholder with a list of holders of se-
curities of a class from which proxies have been solicited or are to
be solicited on management's behalf in connection with a share-
holder meeting or action by consent or authorization; or (2) mail
the requesting shareholder's soliciting materials to shareholders
or subgroups of shareholders of that class.197
The registrant has the option of either providing a shareholder
list or mailing the soliciting shareholder's materials as long as
the solicitation does not relate to a roll-up transaction or to a
going private transaction. 198 In the event that either a roll-up
or going private transaction is involved, the choice of a list or
mailing becomes available to the requesting shareholder. 199
Once the statute is triggered, the registrant has five busi-
ness days after the shareholder's request to mail out required
196. In order for a beneficial owner to utilize this rule through its agent, the
registrant must be provided with some type of certification of beneficial ownership
from the beneficial owner. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(c) (1993).
197. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-13. Allowing manage-
ment to choose whether to mail the lists or include the materials with manage-
ment's material represents a significant compromise by the Commission. The
original proposal entirely eliminated management's right to choose and rather es-
tablished a federal right for a shareholder's list. 1991 Proposal, supra note 23, at
979. This may have been perceived as necessary because under state law, the cor-
poration can require a shareholder who requests a shareholder list to demonstrate
in court that he has a proper purpose for requesting the list. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (1993) (defining "proper purpose" as "a purpose reasonably
related to such person's interests as a stockholder"); General Time Corp. v. Talley
Indus., 240 A.2d 755, 756 (Del. 1968) (stating that the propriety of inspection must
be determined upon the facts of the particular case). This delay and expense is
often fatal to the shareholder's plight.
Commentators argued that the commission had exceeded its authority by pro-
viding a federal right to a shareholder list and invaded the province of state corpo-
rate law. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-13 (citing Letter from
the Business Roundtable to the Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 28,
1992) (on file with the SEC)); see also Business Roundtable v. The Securities and
Exchange Commission, 905 F.2d 406, 417 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that the SEC
had exceeded its powers by enacting "one-share-one-vote" rule, because corporate
voting is within the auspices of state corporate law). The SEC ceded to these pres-
sures and did not reverse the presumption that management may choose to either
send the materials or mail the shareholder list.
198. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-13. For a discussion
of going private and roll-up transactions see infra notes 230-31.
199. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-13.
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materials. 200 If the registrant chooses to mail the materials for
the shareholder, the amended list of materials includes: notifi-
cation as to which option the registrant has chosen;201 the ap-
proximate number of record holders and beneficial owners
management either has or plans to solicit;20 2 and the estimated
cost of mailing a proxy statement, proxy form, or other proxy
material.20 3 Shareholders are required to reimburse the com-
pany for any reasonable expenses incurred in regard to mailing
of the shareholder's material.2°4 Since the shareholders do not
have a war chest equal to management, shareholders may
choose to have management target the shareholder's com-
munications to a specific group of shareholders, usually large
holders.
If the registrant chooses to mail the shareholder lists or is
required to because of the nature of the transaction, they must
include: the most recent list containing the beneficial owners'
names, addresses, and equity positions provided that the bene-
ficial owners do not object to disclosure of this information. 20 5
200. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(a)(1) (1993). This is a significant amendment be-
cause under the old rules management used to be able to delay mailing the insur-
gent's materials until it was ready to mail its own materials, and, hence, could
counter many of the insurgent's claims. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(a)(1) (1992). Now
they must be mailed within five days. The length of time provided for delivery was
lengthened in the amendments from the reproposal which required delivery within
two business days. 1992 Reproposal, supra note 24, at 976.
201. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(a)(1)(i) (1993).
202. Id. § 240.14a-7(a)(1)(ii).
203. Id. § 240.14a-7(a)(1)(iii). The estimate must also include "the estimated
costs of any bank, broker, and similar person through whom the registrant has
solicited or intends to solicit beneficial owners in connection with the security
holder meeting or action." Id.
204. Id. § 240.14a-7(e).
205. Id. § 240.14a-7(a)(2)(ii). The original proposal required the registrant to
provide the "names, addresses, and security holdings of both record and non-ob-
jecting beneficial owners ('NOBO') or consenting beneficial owners ('COBOS')".
1991 Proposal, supra note 23, at 979. The reproposal and amendments reduce the
registrant's obligations under the proposal in regard to beneficial owner lists. The
reproposal only required the registrant to provide beneficial owner information
which is available at the time of request. 1992 Reproposal, supra note 24, at 961.
Therefore, the registrant is not required to track down and obtain a list of benefi-
cial owners; they merely have to share any lists of beneficial owners they have
already acquired. Critics of the beneficial list requirements believe disclosure of
these lists may breach the list's confidentiality or by furnishing third parties their
names, addresses, and equity positions, invade the beneficial owner's privacy. Id.
at 962-63. The Commission rebutted this position by stating that state corporate
law specifically recognizes a right to access for such shareholder list requests. Id.
504
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These lists must be either updated daily or at the shortest rea-
sonable intervals. 20 6
Shareholder list recipients must provide documented certi-
fication that the lists will not be used in any matter not corre-
sponding to the proxies solicited and/or the accompanying
meeting.20 7 The recipient must also agree not to disclose the list
information to any person other than the beneficial owner or
any parties necessary to the distribution 208 and that they will
return the list at the end of the solicitation.20 9 The shareholder
agreements are not filed with the SEC, 210 rather they are con-
tracts, whose breach is actionable as a contract action. Once
the shareholder has used the lists, they must be returned and
all copies must be destroyed. 211
C. Filing and Prefiling Amendments
1. The Old Rules and Perceived Inadequacies
In addition to legal costs and compliance costs amassed
under the Commission's communication regulation, pre-filing
and/or filing requirements for most soliciting material also have
a significant chilling effect on shareholder activism. 212 Propo-
at 962. The final amendments require that the registrant provide "a reasonably
current list of beneficial owners obtained by the registrant pursuant to Rule 14a-
13(b) (the 'NOBO/COBO list') if the registrant has obtained such a list or (updated
list) for its own use prior to the meeting or other shareholder action." 1992 Final
Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-14.
206. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-14. The registrant's
duty to update the proxy materials continues until the record date. Ownership
after the record date, the date which determines a voter's eligibility, would be im-
material to any proxy vote, and, therefore, is not required to be disclosed by the
registrant. Id.
207. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(c)(2)(i) (1993).
208. Id. § 240.14a-7(c)(2)(ii).
209. Id. § 240.14a-7(d).
210. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-15.
211. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(d) (1993). The treatment of these lists is similar to
the treatment of tender offers under Rule 14-d-5(e)(4). Id. § 240.14d-5(e)(4).
212. Letter from CalPERS to Linda C. Quinn, Director of the Division of Cor-
porate Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 3, 1989) in 1 22ND
ANNUAL INsTrTUTE ON Sscuurrms REGULATION 295, 304 (PLI Corp. Law and Prac-
tice Course Handbook Series No. 712, 1990). Under the old rules certain "plain
vanilla" -issues were exempted from the pre-filing and filing requirements. Plain
vanilla issues were routine issues that did not require a proxy statement to be filed
in preliminary form and reviewed by the SEC because they were deemed so garden
variety as to not warrant the time and expense required to file. These routine
47
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nents of reform argue that the rules are so vague as to require
time consuming SEC review in all cases. Pre-amendment Rule
14a-6 required preliminary filing of all proxy statements as well
as any additional proxy soliciting materials ten business days
before release. 213 Pre-amendment Rules 14a-11(e) and 14a-12
also required the filing of the preliminary forms of all released
materials five days before the distribution of the proxy state-
ment.214 Pre-amendment Rule 14c-5(a) also required prelimi-
nary filing for information statements with the SEC.215
Under this pre-filing system, the Commission would review
the proxy material and issue a comment.216 The registrant
would then be expected to incorporate the comments and file
amended material. 217 The Commission was often criticized for
reducing the quality and substance of the communications dur-
ing its pre-screenings. 218 Parties involved in the transaction,
such as the registrant or institutional investors, are aware of
the corporation's financial activities and composition. There-
fore, they are better suited than the Commission to identify any
inaccuracies in soliciting materials. Under liberal shareholder
communication rules, the investor or registrant can point out
inaccuracies to fellow shareholders. The Commission finds this
process more cost effective than reviewing the materials them-
selves. 21 9 Hence, under the new rules, pre-filing in most circum-
stances is no longer necessary. 220
matters were specified in Rule 14a-6 and included: uncontested election for direc-
tors, ratification or elections of independent accountants, and uncontested 14(a)
proposals. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-6(a)(1)-(3), notes (1)-(3) (1992).
213. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(a) (1992).
214. Id. § 240.14a-11(e), -12(b). A two-day preliminary filing deadline was
required with respect to election contests. Id. § 240.14a-11(e). A similar two-day
requirement was also imposed upon matters in opposition to tender offers or "other
publicized activity." Id. § 240.14a-12.
215. Id. § 240.14c-5(a).
216. WATERs, supra note 125, at 139-40. Moreover, all material filed was non-
public information.
217. Id.
218. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-11.
219. Id.
220. Id. This however assumes that a party involved in a transaction will
reveal relevant information with the same frequency as the SEC, which is a party
neutral to the transaction.
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2. Amendments to Rules 14a-6, 14a-11, 14a-12 and
14c-5: Exempting Solicitations from Preliminary
Filing
The Commission amended Rules 14a-6, 14a-11, 14a-12, and
14c-5 to eliminate prior review by the Commission of most
proxy soliciting material: filing is required only "in definitive
form at the time of dissemination."221 Preliminary filing is only
required for forms of proxy, written proxy statements,222 and in-
formation statements. 223 Materials not subject to pre-filing
must now either be filed with the Commission and national ex-
changes on the same day they are published, or delivered di-
rectly to the shareholders.224 Moreover, once filed, the party can
begin to solicit with the preliminary filing statement and need
no longer wait for approval prior to soliciting. The Commission
believes these amendments represent the "most cost-efficient
means" to remedy problems associated with pre-screening. 225
In a related matter, the Commission adopted a new policy
governing the public status of preliminarily filed proxies, proxy
statements, 226 and information statements. 227 Under the new
rules, "all preliminary filed proxy statements, forms of proxy,
and information statements will be available to the public upon
filing with the Commission."228 Therefore, management must
be prepared to defend its position immediately upon filing.
221. Id.
222. Id. at S-21 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(a) (1993)).
223. Id. at S-25 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-2(a) (1993)). Previously, only
materials relating to routine matters in which there was no opposition were ex-
empted from the prefiling requirement. WATERS, supra note 125, at 134.
224. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-11.
225. Id.
226. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(e)(1) (1993).
227. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-5(d)(1) (1993).
228. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-13. The Commission
initially proposed to make public all preliminary materials. Id. at S-12. See 1991
Proposal, supra note 23, at 978.
The proposal presented the following:
[a]lthough the proposals would not dispense with preliminary filing of the
written proxy statement or form of proxy, the proposed amendments would
eliminate the non-public treatment of preliminary proxy statements. Under
the proposed approach, preliminary proxy materials would be treated in a
manner similar to registration statements required by Section 5 of the Se-
curities Act of 1933.
1994] 507
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Preliminary materials for certain business combinations,
filed according to Item 14 of Schedule 14A (mergers, consolida-
tions, acquisitions, and similar matters) represent the only ex-
ception to this new rule, and may be confidential at the
registrant's discretion. 229 "Going private" transactions230 and
"roll-up" transactions231 are excluded from the confidentiality
option and are made public upon filing.232 In support of this
treatment, the Commission noted "the need for confidentiality
[for roll-up and going private transactions] appears significantly
less compelling, and the benefits of disclosure concomitantly
greater."233 Both of these transactions have troubled the Com-
mission23 4 in the past and thus did not receive the exemption.25
The 1992 reproposal included a proposed rule which granted confidentiality
upon request for proxies filed for various business combinations under Item 14 of
Schedule 14A: solicitations dealing with mergers, consolidations, acquisitions, and
other comparable situations. 1992 Reproposal, supra note 24, at 958. The confi-
dentiality option was only available if the underlying matter had not been made
public. Id. The reproposal provided the same treatment for preliminary informa-
tion statements filed for business combinations under Item 14 of Schedule 14A. Id.
229. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-5(e)(2) (1993). In order to receive confidential treat-
ment the registrants must appropriately mark the material as -"Confidential, For
Use of the Commission only." Id. § 240.14c-5(e)(1)(ii).
230. In a going private transaction, management regains possession of its eq-
uity securities causing its stock to be delisted from a national exchange or cease to
be traded on an inter-dealer network. There exist several basic techniques to take
a corporation private. These are the following: (1) a cash tender by management,
or an affiliated entity; (2) a merger with another company wholly owned by man-
agement or an affiliated entity; (3) an exchange offer by management or an affili-
ate; and (4) a reverse stock split. See generally, Mary C. Burson, Note, Securities
Law: An Argument for Recognition of an Implied Private Cause of Action for Share-
holders Under Section 13(e) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 in the Con-
text of Going Private, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 606, 608-09 (1989).
231. A "roll-up" is the "consolidation, merger, restructuring or repackaging of
a group of limited partnerships." George Yearsich et al., Securities Law Aspects of
Partnerships in PARTNERSmps: UPA, ULPA, SEcuRrriEs, TAXATION AND BANK-
RUPTCY 995, 1097 (A.B.A. - A.L.I. Resource Materials 10th ed. 1992). In a roll-up
transaction "several generally nontraded partnerships ... are merged into a new
investment vehicle listed on a stock exchange or quoted in NASDAQ." Id.
232. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-5(e)(2)(i) (1993).
233. 1992 Reproposal, supra note 24, at 958.
234. Dean Foust, 'Roll ups' are Raising Brows in Congress, Bus. Wy., Mar. 18,
1991, at 116. The SEC requires extensive disclosure in going private and other
transactions because in such transactions the corporate insiders have conflicting
interests. Ted J. Fiflis, Responsibility of Investment Bankers to Shareholders, 70
WASH. U. L.Q. 497, 498-99 (1992). Management serves as both the buyer and the
seller of the corporation and, therefore, the SEC requires extensive disclosure re-
garding "fairness opinions," and other necessary information to insure there is no
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The Commission believes making these materials public will
"expedite shareholder access to material information concern-
ing the subject matter of the solicitation and allow for a more
meaningful opportunity to respond to the proposed
solicitation."236
D. Amendments to the Presentation of Management
Proposals
1. Old Rules and Perceived Inadequacies
Prior to the amendments, management proposals were
often "bundled" or grouped in such a manner that several mat-
ters were advanced under one proposal. The practical result of
this grouping could require that a shareholder vote for a propo-
sal he did not support in order to vote for a matter he did sup-
port. Management's authority to "bundle" matters was derived
from the pre-amendment Rule 14a-4(a) which permitted a
misdealing on behalf of management. Id. On October 30, 1991, addressing these
concerns, the SEC issued rules providing enhanced disclosure for roll-up transac-
tions. Abigail Arms, Current Issues and Rulemaking Projects: Division of Corpo-
rate Finance, in ADVANCED SECURITIES LAW WORKSHOP 1992 67, 132 (PLI Corp.
Law and Practice Course Handbook Series 1992). The SEC's new regulations for
roll-ups and existing going private regulations have been criticized for ineffectively
protecting investors. See generally Deborah A. Demott, Rollups of Limited Part-
nerships: Questions of Regulation and Fairness, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 617, 631-33
(1992) (concluding that the SEC response to roll-ups has been less than ideal); A.A.
Sommer, Jr., "Going Private" Seventeen Years Later, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 571, 573-75
(1992) (tracing the SEC regulation of going private transactions and concluding
that the disclosure requirements do not deter such transactions).
235. Moreover, prior to amendment, the broad definition of solicitation com-
plicated any efforts by investors to organize in opposition of the roll-up transaction.
Demott, supra note 234, at 623.
236. 1992 Reproposal, supra note 24, at 957-58. Commentators argued that
preliminary materials should remain nonpublic. Letter from the Business Round-
table to The Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 28, 1992) (on file with the
SEC). They argued that making such materials public prior to review by the Com-
mission, a step still required for proxies, could result in misleading information
being placed in the marketplace. Hence, "making such materials public may do
more harm than good." WATERS, supra note 125, at 500. In the final amendments,
the Commission discounted such arguments, stating that
the Commission does not believe there is a real difference in this respect
between preliminary proxy materials and other documents... and periodic
reports. In each case, staff comment may result in amendments after the
filings have been publicly available and disseminated, and may have been
relied upon by the market.
1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-12.
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"group of related matters" to be presented in the proxy.23 7 Some
commentators contended that the Commission has once again
invaded an area typically governed by state corporate law and,
hence, the Commission lacked authority to enact this rule.23 8
One Commentator compared corporate bundling to the
bundling that occurs in United States legislation:
23 9
[w]e feel that "bundling" may lead to abuses similar to those seen
every day in the U.S. Congress where unrelated, little-supported,
parochial matters are frequently attached to bills having enthusi-
astic universal support, resulting in the "catch-22" situation of ac-
cepting the undesirable proposal to get the benefit of the desirable
proposal or foregoing the desirable proposal to defeat the undesir-
able proposal. Being compelled to make Hobson's choices is not in
the best interest of shareholders. 240
In comparison with Congressional packaging of proposals, un-
bundling is similar to a line item veto.
2. Amendments to Rules 14a-4(a) and (b): Unbundling
Management's Proposals
Rules 14a-4(a) & (b) were amended to change the presenta-
tion of matters on the proxy to provide increased efficiency to
shareholder suffrage. 241 The amended rules prohibit manage-
ment from bundling unrelated matters in proposals placed for a
shareholder vote. Instead, the registrant must clearly identify
"each separate matter intended to be acted upon."242 The
amendments still allow issues to be contingent upon each other,
provided voting consequences are explicitly stated. However,
the contingencies may no longer be bundled.243 Further, the
amendments require that the shareholder be permitted to
237. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)(3) (1992).
238. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-16.
239. Letter from Oppenheimer Capital, to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (Aug. 19, 1992) (on file with the SEC).
240. Id.
241. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-15 to S-16; see gener-
ally 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)-(b) (1993).
242. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)(3) (1993).
243. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-15. Management can
say 'proposal 1 will not be given effect unless proposal 2 is accepted," however,
they can not present both proposals as one for a shareholder vote. This may be
difficult to apply in practice because different types of proposals may have many
different features which could arguably be the basis for a separate proposal.
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either approve, disapprove, or abstain with respect to each sep-
arate matter.
244
E. Election Contests and Reporting
1. Old Rules and Perceived Inadequacies
Prior to the Commission's 1992 revisions, the proxy rules in
conjunction with state corporate law served to impede minority
representation on the board of directors. State law generally
allowed the shareholder to submit one proxy card in connection
with a solicitation, either that of management or that of the dis-
sident. Federal securities law did not allow the naming of nomi-
nees on any form of proxy unless the nominees consented to be
listed on the dissident proxy statement and "serve if elected."245
Since management nominees rarely, if ever, consented to be
named on dissident slates, shareholders supporting a dissident
slate were effectively deprived of an opportunity to vote the re-
maining positions on the board of directors. 246
Institutional investors tried some creative self-help to rem-
edy this situation by stapling cards together and crossing out
the names of directors they did not want to support. The Com-
mission believed that management did not have to count these
votes because of the variation in the execution of the cards. 247
After a couple of these decisions, shareholders did not dare to be
creative in finding ways to split their votes.
244. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(1) (1993).
245. Id. § 240.14a-4(d) (1992).
246. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-16. For example, if
ten board positions were being elected and the dissident slate consisted of three
nominees, a shareholder supporting a dissident slate could only send in the dissi-
dent's proxy. Any considerations the shareholder had concerning the other seven
board positions would be conceded. Furthermore, the seven votes not cast would
be classified as abstentions. Abstentions reduce the total amount of votes required
to become elected because the total number of votes are reduced by abstentions. In
the above example, if 50 out of 100 shares are voted for the dissident slate, those
proxies will not be included in the votes for the remaining seven directors on man-
agement's slate. Therefore, management's slate will only need 26 votes (26/50 >
50%), as opposed to 51 votes, to be elected. For more discussion on the mathemati-
cal anomalies of "vote splitting," see Gilson, Gordon & Pound, How Proxy Rules
Discourage Constructive Engagement: Regulatory Barriers to Electing a Minority of
Directors, 17 J. CoRp. L. 29 (1992).
247. Interview with Catherine Dixon, Counsel to Chairman Wallman, United
States Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 11, 1994).
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Furthermore, there was a concern by ERISA fund manag-
ers that by voting for a short slate, they might breach fiduciary
duties owed to their constituencies. This concern was generated
after a Department of Labor determination that a share's vote
was an economic asset of the fund and cannot be wasted, and
that doing so resulted in an actionable breach. 24
Under the amended rules, the shareholder will no longer be
dissuaded from supporting a "short slate" because of reluctance
to forfeit a portion of his voting power. Also removed is the fear
of breaching a fiduciary duty and the use of self help to support
a full slate.
2. Amendments to Rule 14a-4(d): Permission to Round
Out Dissident Slates with Bona Fide Nominees
The amendments to the "Bonafide Nominee Rule" permit a
party soliciting proxies for a minority of the board, i.e., a dissi-
dent shareholder, to include management's nominees in its
slate, even if such nominees do not consent.249 As amended, a
"universal ballot results, where a soliciting shareholder's proxy
card can provide a space for company nominees, alongside the
soliciting shareholder's nominees."250 The new proxy card
clearly delineates a dissident shareholder's nominees from
248. Letter from the Department of Labor, Pension & Welfare Programs,
dated Feb. 23, 1988 in 1988 ERISA LEXIS 19, *5. See supra note 70 and accompa-
nying text.
249. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(d) (1993). The SEC also amended the first sen-
tence of paragraph (a) of Rule 14c-2. Id. § 240.14c-2(a). This amendment clarified
previous changes to shareholder communication regulation implemented in Janu-
ary of 1992. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-12. The 1992
revision conformed the proxy regulations with the Shareholder Communications
Improvement Act of 1990. Id. at S-18 (citing the Exchange Act, Rel. No. 30147 and
the Investment Company Act, Rel. No. 18467, 57 Fed. Reg. 1096 (1992)). Specifi-
cally, the pre-revision sentence of paragraph (a) of Rule 14c-2 was vague and could
be interpreted to have extended information statement delivery requirements to
"meetings of holders of unregistered securities where the registrant had registered
a different class of securities under Section 12 of the Exchange Act." Id. This was
not the intention of the revisions and Rule 14c-2(a) was amended to clearly indi-
cate that the Rule only applies "to meetings of holders of a class of securities regis-
tered pursuant to section 12 of the Exchange Act or a class of securities issued by
an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940."
Id.
250. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-16.
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those selected from management 251 by requiring the insurgent
to list those management nominees that will not be voted for
with its proxy rather than the ones that will be voted for.252
251. The SEC provided a sample proxy statement under the new rules. Id. at
S-17 to S-18. This sample appears as follows:
PROXY
ABC Corporation
ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS
This Proxy is Solicited by the Shareholder Committee to Revitalize ABC
Corporation.
The undersigned hereby appoints Joseph Robert et al. as proxies
and revokes any previous proxies with respect to the matters covered
by this proxy.
ELECTION OF DIRECTORS:
1. Shareholder Committee Nominees - Election of Joseph Robert,
Mary White, and Kevin Black
FOR all nominees [ ] WITHHOLD AUTHORITY for all nominees [1
Instruction: To withhold authority to vote for election of one or more
persons nominated by the Shareholder Committee, mark FOR above
and cross out name(s) of persons with respect to whom authority is
withheld.
2. Company Nominees
The Shareholder Committee intends to use this proxy to vote for per-
sons who have been nominated by ABC Corporation to serve as direc-
tors, other than the company nominees listed below. You may
withhold authority to vote for one or more additional company nomi-
nees, by writing the name of the nominee(s) below. You Should refer to
the proxy statement and form of proxy distributed by the Company for
the names, background, qualifications and other information concern-
ing the company's nominees.
There is no assurance that any of company's nominees will serve as
directors if any of the Shareholder Committee's nominees are elected
to the board.
Company nominees with respect to whom Shareholder Committee is
NOT seeking authority to vote for and WILL NOT exercise any such
authority:
Jane Doe, John Jones, Roger Roy
Write in below the names of any additional company nominees for
which authority to vote is withheld:
Dated:
Signature
Id.
252. The original proposal by the SEC allowed the insurgents to list their
nominees alongside of those management's nominees chosen to round out the
slate. After an uproar by the corporate community, the SEC made this creative
change to avoid confusing shareholders and lending the reputations of manage-
ment's nominees to the dissident slate. See, e.g., Letter from the Business Round-
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Clear identification and separation of management nominees
avoids shareholder confusion as to which nominees are manage-
ment's and which are the insurgent's. Furthermore, clear sepa-
ration avoids the misleading appearance that the insurgent's
nominees have greater stature while allowing the insurgent to
present a full slate of directors.
3. Amendments to Forms 10-K, 10-Q & Schedule 14A:
"Enhanced Disclosure Regarding Voting Results
and Tabulation Policies"253
Forms 10-K and 10-Q 25 4 were amended to require a descrip-
tion of matters voted on by shareholders during the proxy pe-
riod.255 Additionally, the amended forms are required to "state
the number of votes cast for, against, or withheld, as well as the
number of abstentions and broker non-votes as to each matter,
including a separate tabulation with respect to each nominee
for office."256 This is intended to reinforce a movement started
by institutional investors in the 1980s called "just vote no" cam-
paigns.257 Under these proposals, shareholders withhold their
votes in uncontested election contests to show their dissatisfac-
table to the Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 28, 1992) (on file with the
SEC) (urging that inclusion of a nationally prominent manager on a dissident
slate, "despite the language on the card, [may mislead investors] into believing the
insurgent's slate has greater luster than it in fact has").
253. 1992 Reproposal, supra note 24, at 964.
254. These forms are required by the SEC to be filed periodically with the
Commission by publicly traded companies registered under section 12 of the Secur-
ities and Exchange Act of 1934. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1991). Form 10-K is
"designed to provide detailed information about the registrant's financial condi-
tion, business, and management." WATERs, supra note 125, at 188. The two forms
differ in the periods which they cover and must be filed, and the amount of infor-
mation required to be reported. The Form 10-K is required to be filed annually
while the Form 10-Q is filed quarterly. RcHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES
REGULATION 151-53 (1992). Since Form 10-Q is required to be filed with more fre-
quency, the Commission's disclosure requirements for the 10-Q are less compre-
hensive than those regarding Form 10-K. Id.
255. 1992 Reproposal, supra note 24, at 965. This amendment has remained
virtually unchanged throughout the two proposals and the amended rules. 1992
Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-26.
256. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10K Item 4(c), 10Q Item 4(c) (1993).
257. Coined from the Nancy Reagan's "just say no [to drugs]" program. For an
elaborate discussion of the costs and benefits of "just vote no" campaigns, see gener-
ally Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with
Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1993). Professor Grundfest
concludes that "'just vote no' [campaigns] can responsibly prod boards to step up
514
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tion with the present directors. 258 The new rules advance these
proposals by requiring corporations to report the number of
votes received and withheld for each nominee up for election.
The amended rules require reporting of information regard-
ing the voting procedures. Increased disclosure was provided
by amending Item 21 of Schedule 14A, the voting procedures.
Under this new section, the registrant is required to report the
following information: the vote required for approval or election;
the method by which the votes were counted, except for auditor
approval; and the effect of abstentions and broker nonvotes. 259
Disclosure will illustrate to the shareholder the effect of voting
practices and avoid decisions influenced by creative voting
procedures. 260
their oversight of corporate performance and can discourage well-managed firms
from resting on their laurels." Id. at 937.
258. See, e.g., Robert A.G. Monks, To Change a Company, Change the Board,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1993, at A20 (stating he will withhold proxy authority on
132,000 shares of Westinghouse common for management's incumbent directoral
nominees because of the board's "mismanagement"); Chief of Activist Fund 'Fright-
ens' PR Seminar, P.R. SERVICES, July 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Arcnws File (noting that at the Champion International Corporation annual elec-
tion "nearly 10 percent of the vote was withheld to show stockholder disapproval of
the company's performance (Champion ranked 429 on the Standard & Poor's 500
in terms of stockholder return in the 1987-91 period)").
The mere threat of these campaigns by large institutional investors has re-
sulted in concessions by management and directors. See, e.g., Allison Leigh
Cowan, Kodak Chief Wins Support of Key Investor, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1993, at D4
(reporting that after CalPERS impliedly threatened to engage in a "just vote no"
campaign, management granted Dale Hanson, head of CaPERS, a meeting with
management, after which he agreed to give Kodak's incumbents an opportunity to
turn the company around).
259. 17 C.F.R. Schedule 14A, Item 21 (a)-(b) (1993). These various provisions
regulating voting may be required under state corporate law, in the corporation's
by-laws or the corporation's charter. The Commission's amendments only regulate
disclosure and do not invade the jurisdiction of state corporate law. These amend-
ments purport to codify current Commission interpretation of Schedule 14A under
Item 21. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-15.
260. This was enacted because a number of shareholder proposals were actu-
ally drawing more affirmative votes than negative votes, yet, nonetheless getting
defeated because of the way management tabulated the votes. This result could
occur because management often phrased the test for getting a shareholder propo-
sal passed as needing "a majority of the shares present at the meeting." This
means that shareholders who choose to abstain had their votes figured in the de-
nominator, requiring a shareholder proposal to get a majority of the shares voting
and abstaining to prevail. This may be contrary to the desires of an abstaining
shareholder who believes his nonvote is neutral, neither helping nor hindering the
proposal. The amendments are intended to remedy this situation by requiring the
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4. Disclosure in Election Contests
The SEC also eliminated the requirement of filing Schedule
14b which obliged insurgents to list a very detailed background
disclosure about the participants in the solicitation and which
had to be filed before the commencement of the solicitation.26 1
Eliminated with the Schedule 14b is advance warning to man-
agement that there will be an election contest. Furthermore,
under Rule 14a-11 for election contests and Rule 14a-12 for
other types of contested solicitations, solicitation can commence
as long as information is filed simultaneously with publication
or distribution to shareholders. 262 Once you have used that pro-
vision you have a current obligation to disseminate a proxy as
soon as practicable. 26 3 Before any filing, a shareholder is al-
lowed to alert other shareholders that this will be a contest
year, and therefore, management's card should not merely be
executed upon receipt, and that materials explaining the other
side's position will be forwarded to them shortly.26
V. Evaluation
A. Overview
In amending the proxy rules, the SEC aspired to ade-
quately balance freedom of communication with the rights of
market participants to acquire accurate information about a
corporation.265 Many of the amended rules have achieved this
goal by increasing shareholder suffrage, increasing monitoring
corporation to disclose the effects that nonvotes have on the proposals. 17 C.F.R.
§ 14a-101 Items 21 (a)-(b) (1993). Furthermore, the effect of broker nonvotes must
be disclosed to the shareholder. Id. Broker nonvotes are when broker held shares
are present at the annual meeting, yet because the broker didn't receive timely
instructions from their clients on how to vote the shares and since the broker lacks
authority to vote the shares, the shares are not voted.
261. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-10 n.43.
262. Id. at S-13.
263. Id. at S-10.
264. This communication is called a 'stop, look and listen" letter. See, e.g.,
Unicorp Financial Corp. v. First Union Real Estate Equity and Mortgage Invest-
ments, 515 F. Supp. 249, 255 (S.D. Ohio 1981). There is no content restriction in
this type of communication; a shareholder may introduce their themes.
265. Barbara Franklin, SEC Seeks Freer Speech; Shareholder Communica-
tions Proposal Debated, N.Y. L.J., July 2, 1992, at 5. As one commentator stated,
the real issue is whether or not "the SEC struck an appropriate balance between
two valid objectives-freedom of communication, and provision of adequate infor-
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of corporate management and influencing corporate success.
However, an alarming trend has emerged. Institutional inves-
tors have garnered the newfound power of the proxy rules to
directly intimidate management and have thus skirted the
proxy rules. This institutional investor activity has decreased
discourse to the entire market contrary to the SEC's intent in
amending the proxy rules. The danger posed by this conduct is
significant because the interests of large institutional investors,
particularly pension funds, often differ from the interests of in-
dividual shareholders. Moreover, these risks are significant be-
cause this new technique is beyond the reach of existing
regulatory barriers, specifically section 13(d) of the Exchange
Act and Regulation 13DG. Furthermore, despite the new kin-
ship between institutional investors and management, com-
plete deregulation of oral solicitations presents a danger that
the proxy solicitation procedure will be abused as a method of
gaining control.
B. Beneficial Amendments and Responsible Institutional
Influence
Many of the SEC's amendments further shareholder suf-
frage, remove unnecessary regulation, reduce proxy compliance
costs and restore a balance between shareholders and manage-
ment, achieving the desired goals of the review process. The
proxy amendments which achieve these goals are those which
eliminate pre-filing and prior SEC review, unbundle manage-
ment's proposals, establish a Bona Fide Nominee Rule and en-
hance voting, reporting and tabulating. Before amendment,
management could, and did, utilize the proxy machinery to sti-
fle or substantially curtail shareholder democracy. 266 The old
rules significantly favored management and via these amend-
ments, the SEC has restored some balance to the proxy system.
mation to the marketplace and other shareholders on things happening affecting
the company." Id. (quoting R. Todd Lang, Partner at Weil, Gotshal & Manges).
266. For a discussion of how management presented proposals before the un-
bundling amendment to pass proposals otherwise unacceptable to shareholders,
see supra text accompanying notes 237-40. For a discussion on how the proxy
rules were utilized prior to the Bonafide Nominee Rule to defeat insurgents on a
short slate, see supra text accompanying notes 245-48. Finally, for a discussion
how management utilized the shareholder list rules to hamper insurgents, see
supra notes 246, 260 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, these amendments do not favor any group of share-
holders nor empower any shareholder to influence manage-
ment outside the proxy system. The changes are consistent
with clear congressional intent that the rules should be neutral
as between shareholders.267
Both the creation of a safe harbor, as well as various excep-
tions to the definition of a solicitation as applied to small share-
holders,268 achieve the beneficial goal of facilitating shareholder
suffrage. Small shareholders and large shareholders must be
distinguished. Communications with individual investors do
not pose any significant dangers of market impropriety in proxy
matters. The small investor, unlike an institutional investor, is
typically only interested in protecting the value of his invest-
ment. Moreover, the small investor typically lacks the interest,
time, or resources to significantly affect the market, as opposed
to the potential impact of institutional investors. One of the
only ways that small investors can affect the market is if they
coordinate and agree to act in concert. If large enough, this ac-
tivity will trigger disclosure under 13D of the Exchange Act.
Thus, the amendments, as applied to small investors are not
contrary to the preservation of market integrity, an important
tenet of the federal securities laws.
Acting alone, however, large institutional investors often
are not subject to the restraint of 13D. If institutional investors
act responsibly and help to foster long-term growth, in-
stitutional activism could work hand in hand with these
amendments.
It appears that institutional investors have responsibly as-
sumed this new role as monitors of management. There are
many reported instances of beneficial activity by institutional
267. See Letter from Stephen Bainbridge to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, (Aug. 28, 1992) (on file with the SEC) (citing Stock Exchange Prac-
tices: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 6673, 7710-14 (1933-34) ("what we had essentially in mind was putting every
stockholder in a corporation... on an equal footing with every other, if such a
stockholder desired to associate with him other stockholders for what purpose he
has in mind, and making it thereby possible for every stockholder from whom a
proxy is solicited to know definitely what the purpose was of the person soliciting
the proxy")).
268. For the purposes of this rule, small shareholders are those owning less
than either five percent of the outstanding shares or shares with a market value of
one million dollars in a particular security.
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investors in the market since the new proxy rules have taken
effect. Under one such strategy, institutional investor organiza-
tions such as the Institutional Shareholders Services Inc. (ISSI)
have targeted company performance, focusing on under-per-
forming companies, in their activist efforts under the new proxy
rules. 269 The President of ISSI proclaimed the continuity of the
organization's 1993 focus on poorly performing companies.270
Similarly, the Council of Institutional Investors, a group of
the largest public pension funds,271 generated a target list of
under-performing companies for activism in the 1994 proxy sea-
son.27 2 Many funds have also adopted computer programs that
identify poor performers in their portfolios.273 Of great signifi-
cance was the fact that TIAA-CREF, the world's largest pension
fund, indicated that, it too, would be taking a similar activist
stance in the future. 274 Its policy indicates that it would look for
more independent directors, linkage between compensation and
performance for executives, and require that directors own com-
pany stock.275
Many pension funds, including CalPERS, have decided to
pursue investment strategies that use activism to improve un-
derperforming companies. 276 CalPERS has its own ten most
269. Heard Says Poor Performers are Focus of Institutional Investors, 25 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 48, Dec. 17, 1993, at 1690.
270. Id. At the same time, the statement acknowledged that other institu-
tions were still pursuing social causes such as animal testing and environmental
concerns which had replaced more obsolete social concerns such as disinvestment
in South Africa. Id. at 1690-91. See also Christine Phillips, Social Activists Focus
on the Environment, PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS, Apr. 5, 1993, at 16 (noting that
in 1993 the number of shareholder resolutions on environmental matters sur-
passed the number of South Africa-related resolutions).
271. David A. Vise, Turning the Proxy Into a Power Tool; Investors Use Clout
Gained in SEC Rules, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1993, at Fl. The Council, only 8 years
old, represents over $500 billion in assets. See also Anne Saker, When These Inves-
tors Talk, CEOS, Companies Quake, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 25, 1993, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
272. Institutions Gear Up for the Proxy Season, INsIGHTS, Nov. 1993, at 32
[hereinafter Institutions Gear Up].
273. Martin Dickson, Crusaders In the Capitalist Cause, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 17,
1993, at 17.
274. Institutions Gear Up, supra note 272, at 32.
275. Id.
276. Dickson, supra note 273, at 17.
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wanted list of underperforming companies in its portfolio.27 7
CalPERS placed these companies and their managements on
notice of its dissatisfaction and sent twenty-two warning letters
to companies dangerously close to falling below CalPERS expec-
tations.278 Other funds have incorporated similar programs in
hopes of attracting fund money for this new relational
investing.279
To the credit of the institutional investor, management is
taking notice of institutional activity. Institutional activism
has resulted in several high profile shake-ups and outright dis-
missal of the nation's top executives. 280 Among the fallen stars,
were the CEOs of General Motors, Digital Equipment, Compaq,
Goodyear, Hartmarx, Imcera, and Tenneco. 281 Moreover, the
CEO's of IBM, Sears, and Westinghouse have all had to concede
to various institutional demands to avoid dismissal. 28 2 One
common concession by corporations was the separation of the
CEO and Chairman of the Board positions. These positions
were often held by the same person, a practice which effectively
removed the board's ability to oversee management. 28 3 Like-
wise, CEOs of small and medium sized firms also felt the pres-
277. Bigger They Are, Harder they Fall; '93 Tough Year for Executives, PLAIN
DEALER, Jan. 2, 1994, at 1E [hereinafter Bigger They Are].
278. Id. On the other hand, Professor Romano also reports that CalPERS, in
1992, decided to pursue investing over $375 million dollars into single family home
construction after being influenced by the Governor to invest in California. Id.
279. See, e.g., Mary C. Driscoll, Loaded for Bear, CFO, July 1993, at 27, 28-29
(reporting that Lens, Inc., a targeting investment fund, hopes to lead the trend
away from fund indexing to relational investing by attracting "$1 billion from large
pension funds that follow an index approach to equity investing").
In the same way that companies are being targeted, investors are being
targeted by management as well. Management is looking for investors that will be
stable and productive in their relations with the corporation. John Wilcox & Rich-
ard Wines, Investor Targeting: A Quantitative Approach to Reaching Institutions,
INSIGHTS, May 1993, at 14.
280. Thomas Stewart, The King is Dead, FORTUNE, Jan. 11, 1993, at 34; Big-
ger They Are, supra note 277, at 1E.
281. Stewart, supra note 280, at 34.
282. Id.
283. Id.; L.M. Sixell, Company Boards Grow Independent, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Oct. 26, 1993, at 1. Other common proposals by shareholders are removal of
golden parachute contracts, enactment of confidential voting, repealing of classi-
fied boards, creation of independent nominating board committees, increasing the
number of outside directors, creation of compensation limits, and creation of share-
holder advisory committees. INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER, CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE SERVICE VOTING RESULTS 1991-1992 at 3 (1994).
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sures of institutional influence, some through dismissal and
others through concession.284 One commentator states that
"'the CEO will look less like an emperor than like a Congress-
man, trying to represent his various constituents and, to the ex-
tent he succeeds, being reelected.' "285
The effect hasn't been lost on corporate boards, who are act-
ing "like the B-school textbooks say they are supposed to. They
asked management tough questions and stopped being rubber
stamps... "286 Thus, the institutional investor is at the head of
what many call a great "cultural change" in corporate govern-
ance.28 7 The institutional investor is being characterized as the
catalyst for performance in corporate America. The proxy rule
amendments are credited with facilitating and legitimizing the
efforts of institutional investors to effect change in corporate
performance. 28 However, while corporate governance appears
to have improved and institutional investors appear to be acting
responsibly, alarming trends and regulatory gaps in the present
proxy regulatory system have arisen.
C. Dangerous Developments: Skirting the Proxy Rules-
Institutional Investors v. Individual Investors
The securities laws were founded and legitimized by the
principle of shareholder democracy and the investor protection
that shareholder democracy ensures.28 9 These objectives are
better achieved "by promoting free discussion, debate and learn-
ing among shareholders and interested persons, than by placing
restraints on that process to ensure that management has the
ability to address every point raised in the exchange of
views."290 However, the new proxy amendments often only in-
284. Bigger They Are, supra note 277, at 1E.
285. Stewart, supra note 280, at 34 (quoting John Pound, professor at
Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government).
286. Id. at 34.
287. Vineeta Anand, Executive Update, Corporate Governance, INVESTOR'S
Bus. DAILY, Jan. 25, 1993, at 4 (quoting Bernard S. Black, law professor at Colum-
bia Law School).
288. Bigger They Are, supra note 277, at 1E; see also, Fran Hawthorne, What
the New SEC Rules Do for Activism, INSTTUrTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1993, at 47-48;
infra text accompanying notes 293-98.
289. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964).
290. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-16 to S-17.
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crease the voice of institutional shareholders at the expense of
excluding the individual shareholder. 291
Institutional investors are contributing a great deal to the
discourse between themselves and management at the expense
of disclosure. Disclosure to individual investors, the market
and potential market participants has significantly decreased.
The SEC's method for increasing discourse has resulted in
greater control of information and disclosure by institutional in-
vestors. Management, by reacting and favoring the institu-
tional investor, has helped to contribute to the prejudice and
dilution of the individual investors' rights, discouraging their
investment in the market.292
Recent activity has shown that institutions are not simply
interested in adding to the stream of discourse, but rather have
used their liberated power to intimidate management.293 One
commentator has called the new rules "irrelevant," concluding
that the "real power of the rules is that they don't have to be
used: Just the threat that big institutions will marshal forces
has been enough to get managements to sit down with major
shareholders to head off complaints."294 Often the institutional
influence occurs behind-the-scenes without media scrutiny or
291. The authors of this article do not argue that large institutional investors,
owners of the corporate equity, should be divorced from their voting rights, how-
ever, neither should regulators turn a blind eye to their activities. As one commen-
tator noted "[it is not simply a question of a stockholder's right to speak; he has
always had this right. It is a question of stockholder's right to know what others
are saying -and how they are trying to affect his investment." Letter from Ameri-
can Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. to the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion 4 (Aug. 4, 1992) (on file with the SEC).
292. Id. See also Editorial, Investors, Managers Must Co-Operate, Fn'. POST,
May 29, 1993, at S1 (discussing recent heated debate concerning the rights of indi-
vidual investors, institutional investors, and management). One commentator
stated that "it is wrong to cast institutional investors as 'saints' and corporate
management as 'sinners'. More informed and active shareholders can be beneficial
to management. But a confrontational attitude can divert management's attention
and embroil the investors too much in the affairs of the companies in which they
hold equity." Id. Another stated "'[n]ow is the time for the shareholders and the
institutions to be studied,' . . . [w]e know little or nothing about how these major
investor types exercise their shareholding responsibilities. To whom are the finan-
cial institutions accountable?" Id.
293. Fran Hawthorne, What the New SEC Rules Do for Activism, INsTrru-
TIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1993, at 47.
294. Id. However, as one commentator posited " ' [alnyone who wants to use
the power can use disproportionate leverage because others don't use the vote.'"
Joel Chernoff, Institutions Strengthen Grip on Companies, PENSIONS AND INVEST-
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individual investor awareness. 295 The amendments have sim-
ply given the institutional investor a tactical edge over manage-
ment and individual investors. 296 Managers and institutions
now prefer quiet negotiations instead of proxy contests.297 As
such, the institutional investor is more apt to influence or even
dictate its wishes to management.
Thus, the institutional investor's views will only reach
management in many instances, and individual investors will
never realize their rights have been compromised. Nor will this
discourse ever affect their decisions because they are shut out of
back room discussions between management and institutions.
Furthermore, the shareholders elected the directors to run the
corporation; the shareholders never elected the institutional in-
vestor to manage their investment. Some view institutional in-
vestor board representation as the inevitable evolution of the
responsible institutional investor, evidencing its true intention
as a long term and active player in the success of the com-
pany.298 Despite the institutional investor's possible conflicts of
interests, the individual investor will still retain its right to
delegate to the board, be aware of its actions under required
disclosure and have state corporate law remedies available to
hold managers and directors accountable.
D. Significance of Institutional Favoritism: Conflicting
Interests
Favoritism and unequal treatment of institutions and indi-
vidual investors have significant consequences for the equity
markets. Participation of both the individual investor and the
institutional investor are essential to the future growth and via-
bility of our equity markets. Institutional investors, because of
MENTs, Mar. 8, 1993, at 1 (quoting Carolyn Brancato, Executive Director of Colum-
bia University Institutional Investor Project).
295. Vise, supra note 271, at Fl; see also Richard W. Stevenson, Large Foot in
the Board-Room Door, N.Y. TMEs, June 6, 1991, at D1 (noting that CalPERS often
advances its interests with behind-the-scenes negotiations).
296. Dickson, supra note 273, at 17.
297. Id. at 17; New Rules Empowering Shareholders Take Hold; Regulation:
As the First Proxy Season Under SEC's Reforms Approaches, There's Plenty of Ac-
tion in Corporate Boardrooms, L.A. TIMES, January 2, 1993, at D2.
298. Judith H. Dobrzynski, Relationship Investing: A New Shareholder Is
Emerging - Patient and Involved, Bus. WK., Mar. 15, 1993, at 68-69.
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their size, may benefit our markets if they act as responsible
monitors of management. Equally important is the individual
investor who, though comprised of small investors, constitute
forty-seven percent of the equity markets. 299 Individual inves-
tor protection and future participation maintains the U.S. mar-
ket's depth and liquidity, one of the primary strengths of our
markets. The market's liquid nature allows for greater eco-
nomic growth because capital can easily shift to new ventures
based on market preferences. Therefore, individual share-
holder protection and continued confidence in our market,
through a market as clear of misinformation and fraud as possi-
ble, is of paramount concern.
Due to their preference for the institutional investor, the
current rules threaten our market. In order to understand the
significance of the rules' preference, we must first analyze the
parallel and conflicting interests of these two shareholder
groups. Furthermore, special attention must be paid to certain
political characteristics of the institutional investor and how
the rules, to date, have enabled the institutional investor to
act.300
Since institutional investors are highly diversified inves-
tors, their risks may not be aligned with the interests of smaller
undiversified investors. Individual investors seek to maximize
their return on investment. The institutional investor, too, is
concerned with maximizing his return, but this is often a max-
imization in the aggregate, which is referred to as indexing. In-
stitutional investors, through large holdings or indexed
portfolios, have eliminated individual risk or unsystematic
risk,3°1 and only possess market risk.3°2 In other words, indexed
institutional investors not only own all of the companies in a
299. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 5.
300. Value judgments as to which group is a greater benefit to the markets
are misplaced in the context of securities regulation. Of far more concern is
whether the objectives of the institutions are or are not parallel with individual
shareholders or even other institutions, not that the institution's objectives are
correct or incorrect. The SEC was not established to encourage one form of invest-
ment or corporate strategy over another; its primary obligation is to ensure that
anyone investing can make an informed decision. In the absence of regulation or
by favoring one group of investors over another, information can be distorted or
fraudulently conveyed in order to further these ulterior motives.
301. Unsystematic risk is "company specific risk... caused by things such as
lawsuits, strikes, successful and unsuccessful marketing programs, winning and
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particular industry, "they own all of the industries that consti-
tute the business component of the national economy."303 Due
to their large holdings, institutions make decisions on a much
larger scale, which may be divergent from a decision based on
the success of an individual company. 304
In considering the consequences of any act, institutions,
which are not concerned with systematic risks, may support an
action adverse to other shareholders. For example, "'[tihe
bankruptcy of an airline, for example, might be a disaster for its
employees and managers who lose jobs, but a matter of indiffer-
ence to its investors who own shares in other airline companies
that obtain the bankrupt company's routes.'"305 Therefore, in
allowing diversified institutional investors to govern a corpora-
tion, they are permitted the gains, while the downside risk of
unsuccessful business policies will be borne by the corporation's
other shareholders. Those bearing the risk will be the undiver-
sified, typically smaller shareholders and employees. In this re-
spect, the shareholder communication deregulation is similar to
the Savings & Loan deregulation: the diversified institutional
investor is allowed to gamble with other people's money and
jobs. They enjoy the benefits of higher return from investor in-
duced assumption of debt, yet don't share the costs or potential
bankruptcy, due to diversification.306
Institutional investors often operate under the political in-
terests of their constituencies, which may significantly diverge
from those of the individual investor. This type of policy is
termed "social investing,"30 7 because decisions are controlled or
affected by a wide variety of individuals, who may pressure the
losing major contracts, and other events that are unique to a particular firm."
WESTON & BRIGHAM, supra note 120, at 191.
302. Market risk "on the other hand, stems from factors which affect all firms
simultaneously, such as a war, inflation, recessions, and high interest rates." Id.
303. MoNKS & MINow, supra note 14, at 261.
304. While this group is represented as the minority due to the difficulty in
representing a single voice, they consist of approximately 47% of the equity mar-
kets. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 5.
305. Donald Margotta, The Separation of Ownership and Responsibility in the
Modern Corporation, Bus. HORIZONS, Jan./Feb. 1989, at 76 (quoting Daniel Fis-
chel, Bus. LAWYER, August 1985, at 1442).
306. Letter from Donald G. Margotta, Professor, Northeastern University, to
the Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 21, 1992) (on file with the SEC).
307. MONKS & MINow, supra note 14, at 221.
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institution to invest in securities for benefits unrelated to their
direct investment. Social investment can be summarized as in-
vestment decisions based not on traditional concerns of "mini-
mizing risk and maximizing return," but on a basis ancillary or
unrelated to traditional financial concerns. 308 The justification
for social investment comes from a desire to maximize other "in-
tangibles" that benefit either beneficiaries or the common
good. 309
Political interests have run a broad spectrum, depending
upon the institutions' constituencies. For example, corporate
pension funds often make decisions based on the interests of the
corporation that funds it or the corporation's employees rather
than maximizing the return of the securities they own.310 Cor-
porations are required to contribute to their employee's pension
plans and thus the continued economic health of the fund is "in-
extricably linked to the health of its corporate sponsor."311
Analogously, trade unions, through their members' pension
funds, have exerted influence to further labor interests.312 The
new proxy regulations will give all trade unions greater share-
308. MoNmS & MINow, supra note 14, at 221-22. Sponsoring investments
based upon political views rather than economic concerns is also considered social
investing. Id. The converse of investing, divestment, in "otherwise investment
worthy" companies that promote an ideal politically or morally adverse to the par-
ties concerned is also considered "social investing." Id. An excellent example of
this form of social investing is divestment from corporations conducting business
with South Africa. This divestiture is based upon political disagreement, not upon
traditional notions of valuation such as financial risk or profit maximization.
309. Id.
310. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, ABUSE ON WALL STREET: CONFLICTS OF IN-
TEREST IN THE SECURITIES MARKETS 579 (1980) (report to the Twentieth Century
Fund Steering Committee on Conflicts of Interest in the Securities Markets) [here-
inafter TwENTIETH CENTURY FUND].
311. THE BATTLE FOR CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 18, at 75 n.8. Subse-
quent to the junk bond market crash, corporate pension funds were in jeopardy of
being underfunded. In the 1980s, corporate fund managers who believed they
were making solid investments did a disservice to their funds' constituents, the
corporations' employees. During this epoch, pension fund investors, desirous of a
high yield investment, purchased junk bonds. The funds' investments, due to their
large aggregate size, stabilized the junk bond markets, thus preserving these in-
struments for corporate raiders, who, with little or no capital up front took over
corporations. The new owners often "busted-up" or sold off profitable assets of the
corporation. Hence, the employee's invested retirement funds were essentially uti-
lized to eliminate their jobs.
312. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 310, at 337.
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holder influence to further union interests, potentially contrary
to the interests of the individual investor.
Perhaps the most striking conflicts are the potential and
realized conflicts of interest involving the public pension funds.
Public pensions are subject to influences directed at their man-
agers: government officials. Public pension funds are vulnera-
ble to this type of activity because they are not subject to the
fiduciary restrictions that private funds endure under ER-
ISA.313 Since state and local governments often serve as sound-
ing boards for special interests groups, public pension plans are
almost guaranteed to be entrenched in decisions affected by
politics. For example, a public pension may invest in otherwise
risky or undesirable investments that promote social welfare,
such as investment in city municipal bonds.314 Governments
can exert a great deal of power through state controlled pension
plans to effectuate their own interests, often different than the
interests of other shareholders and management.
Professor Roberta Romano catalogues several instances of
failed corporate policy that resulted from political meddling in
corporate affairs. These examples demonstrate in whose benefit
the state pension funds often act and the potential of these acts
to be in direct contradiction with the goals of other sharehold-
ers. In one example, the State of Pennsylvania influenced the
Pennsylvania Public School Employees and State Employees
Retirement Fund into contributing to the financing of an in-
state Volkswagen plant.315 The plant was a failure and the in-
vestment suffered. 316 The Volkswagen plant closed in 1988 and
it took the state four years to place Sony in the plant, at a cost of
forgiving $40 million of the original loan, and providing more
state subsidized financing and job training grants. 317 Penn-
sylvania's past history as a staunch supporter of stakeholder
rights,318 especially where the stakeholder is an employee, only
portends further activism in activities that should only focus on
313. Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 795, 800-01 (1993).
314. TwEm-r'H CENTuRY FUND, supra note 310, at 283-84.
315. Romano, supra note 313, at 803-04.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Stakeholders are the proper recipients of the returns or investment capi-
tal in the pension fund.
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business interests. Such interests include pursuing the best in-
vestment possible or focusing on the long term growth of the
company.
In one instance, a pension fund financed a large portion of a
leveraged buy-out of a local corporation in order to preserve
state jobs. 319  The fund's $25 million dollar investment
progressed from being a short term "bridge loan," to a long term
equity investment and, finally, to the precarious position of debt
after the company filed for bankruptcy.320 Another fund
targeted investments in local business, including local steel
mills and savings and loans, both of which failed.321 Further-
more, many funds practice an investment policy that involves
purchasing privately insured mortgage-backed, pass-through
securities that increase the access of local housing markets to
capital.322 In the instances provided by Professor Romano, the
investments were riskier than the prevailing market norm yet
produced less return.323
In many states, the mandates to pursue policies that bene-
fit the home state are enshrined by state statute.324 A serious
problem arises under these state policies: investment activity
that can only increase the value of a fund's portfolio, such as
diversification, are avoided. This occurred in Minnesota in 1988
when organized labor protested and blocked a movement to be-
gin pension fund investment in international markets. 325
The Clinton Administration has issued a cautious state-
ment concerning the use of pension funds to further politically
inspired ventures. On March 26, 1993, The Secretary of Labor,
Robert Reich, promoted the use of pension fund investments in
the nation's infrastructure only if the investments did not "sac-
319. Romano, supra note 313, at 805.
320. Id. (discussing the investment activities of the Connecticut Pension
Fund).
321. Id. (discussing the investment activities of the Kansas Pension Fund).
322. Id. (citing Public Employee Pension Plans: Joint Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight of the House Ways and Means Comm. and the Subcomm. on
Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 98
Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1983)).
323. Romano, supra note 313, at 805.
324. Id. at 808-09.
325. Id. at 806.
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rifice financial returns."326 He stressed that placing the health
of any of the public pension funds in jeopardy was contrary to
sound public policy.3 27 He also stated that a bi-partisan com-
mission's recommendation to create a government sponsored
corporation to rally pension fund investment in the infrastruc-
ture was still under review by the administration.3 28 The full
position of the administration on this issue is unknown, but it is
quite obvious that the Secretary of Labor's announcement did
not view social investing which resulted in high risk and low
returns as a sound investment policy.
The new focus on good business versus good politics, which
mirrors a view towards long term investment and governance
activity by institutional investors, may be the herald of a new
age for responsibility among institutional investors. But is the
new focus on good business a political move for power on the
part of the institutional investor? Or perhaps it is simply the
result of the wave of ire brought on by abuses by management
in the recent past, abuses in which the institutions played a
great role. Like any trend, this new focus will soon be forgotten
by the more opportunist of the institutional investors, who will
manipulate institutional funds for the sake of special interests
and hidden agendas. The question of whether or not it is proper
to pursue political agendas does not even need to be answered.
After all, as the CEO of CalPERS stated, the impetus behind a
pension fund's investment strategy is that the strategy matches
the fund's payout schedules.3 29 There should be no misconcep-
tion as to the ultimate loyalty of a pension fund, it is to itself.
There is nothing improper about this fact, until we entrust
other people's interests and investments to the institutional in-
vestor without allowing for an environment of complete disclo-
sure. Is it prudent to allow the successes of the many
responsible funds to distract us from the indiscretions of those
who might do great damage to the integrity of our market and
economy?
326. Reich Says Pension Funds Should Not Sacrifice Return for Public Bene-
fits, Pensions & Benefits Daily (BNA) 699 (Mar. 29, 1993).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Dobrzynski, supra note 298, at 68-69.
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E. Unregulated Oral Communications: Dangers of Abuse and
a Cost Effective Remedy.
In the first year of the new SEC proxy rules a great deal of
institutional activism has been beneficial. However, "good in-
tentions don't control power; only power does," 330 and through
the amended proxy rules the Commission may have given in-
surgent shareholders more power than corporate management
in proxy contests without concomitant responsibility.33' It
seems that in the excitement over the new accountability for
management and the shift in power from management to the
institutional investor, few are questioning the new power that
the institutional investor holds. In order for the recent amend-
ments to be successful, institutional investors will have to act in
a responsible and prudent manner since certain conduct will go
unregulated. In light of institutional investor participation in
the misdealing of the '80s 332 and the political influences that
pervade the institutional investor, such a delegation or assump-
tion that institutions will always act responsibly, absent regula-
tion, may be misplaced. 333
The new proxy contest rules provide institutional investors
an advantage in the means for corporate acquisition in the
1990's.
Institutional investors, without any fear of violating proxy
rules, are able and capable of disseminating any information
they please, through oral communications, concerning corporate
boards and management practices, including inaccurate or
fraudulent assertions. This new environment has the potential
to attract corporate raiders, foster tender offers, revitalize debt
financing, generate huge transactional fees, and renew collusive
330. Debate, Can Pension Funds Lead the Ownership Revolution?, HARv. Bus.
REV., May-June 1991, at 166, 168.
331. Playing favorites between incumbent management and insurgent share-
holders is contrary to clear congressional intent that the proxy rules are to be neu-
tral. See, e.g., S. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1967) (stating the intent of an
analogous legislative act, the Williams Act, is to "avoid tipping the balance of regu-
lation in favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid").
332. See Letter from Thomson, Hine and Flory, to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (Aug. 21, 1992) (entitled "The Commission's Perspective: Play-
ing The Wrong Favorites") (on file with the SEC). Many of the institutional
investors were major players involved in the improprieties in the boom market of
the 1980s. Id.
333. Id.
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behavior similar to that occurring in the last decade. 334 Even if
the problems of the 1980s do not resurface, the conflicting inter-
ests that guide a market controlled by one block or coalition of
votes without any regulation will certainly affect both the integ-
rity of the market as a whole and the interests of individual
investors.
Current proxy legislation, a reaction to those excesses,
should not play favorites with these investors nor should they
remove regulation regarding their actions in contests for con-
trol.335 As one commentator stated:
[the] suggested solution [to corporate inefficiency, self dealing,
and stagnation] is essentially to get institutional [investors] more
involved in the companies that they invest in. They will solve the
problem by adopting long-run investment goals. But in my opin-
ion, institutional [investors] are the problem, and they are not
likely to be the solution.336
There are a multitude of short-run maneuvers that institutional
investors can engage in without selling their investments. Any
transaction that converts its equity into a new form at the ex-
pense of other shareholders qualifies as such a maneuver.
For example, if a corporate raider launched a proxy contest
to seize control of the board of directors, suggesting a wholesale
liquidation, an institutional investor, desirous of the short-prof-
its, could solicit other institutional shareholders to vote for the
insurgent's slate.337 The institutional investor could make un-
limited oral statements, advance arguments about the corpora-
334. While the number of tenders has significantly decreased in the past five
years, the nature of the market is cyclical. Proxy contests were primary sources of
gaining corporate control in the late '60s and '70s and now twenty years later, in
an admittedly different form, they have returned to prominence in the market for
corporate control. Similarly, the methods utilized in the '80s, while presently rare,
will at some later date, or in some recycled form, return.
335. Letter from Thomson, Hine and Flory, supra note 332.
336. THE BATTLE FOR CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 18, at 81.
337. Letter from The Business Roundtable to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (Aug. 28, 1992) (on file with the SEC). The Business Roundtable pro-
vides another example in its comment letter. This example is as follows:
Institutional Investor A solicits other institutional investors to vote against
a management proposal (e.g., the sale of a division or adoption of corporate
governance changes), calling and personally visiting fellow investors to urge
them to vote against the proposal. No agreement or other orchestrated ac-
tion is suggested. Other shareholders would not know of this effort and
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tion's value, the insurgent's slate, or current management, as
long as the statements are not fraudulent, without any public
disclosure or SEC review.3 38 The transpiration of these events
without any opportunity for management response would give
the insurgents a tremendous advantage. As one commentator
noted, "the ball game could be over, as a practical matter, before
anyone else even knew there was to be a contest."339
To remedy this dilemma the SEC should require disclosure
of exempted solicitations in control contests or contested elec-
tion. Investors would not have to send materials to any other
shareholder or management; public filing would suffice. This
will place management on notice and allow management to re-
spond to or rebut the content of the communication resulting in
an increasing shareholder discourse and shareholder democ-
racy. Furthermore, this remedy would be consistent with the
historical application of the federal securities laws by applying
the law on the basis of substance rather than upon an actor's
identity.340 This remedy is also consistent with the congres-
sional intent of ensuring that all material necessary for in-
management would not have an opportunity to respond or explain its propo-
sal further.
Id.
338. Id. Similarly, "it would be perfectly permissible for a corporate raider
planning to launch a proxy contest for control of a target company's board to phone
or meet personally with large, powerful institutional investors and solicit their
support for his effort without disclosing his activities until much later when he
actually sent out proxy cards." Secret Communications Loophole Attacked by
Roundtable, PR Newswire Association, Inc., Oct. 16, 1992, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Arcnws File (quoting H. Brewster Atwater, Co-chairman, Business
Roundtable Corporate Task Force).
339. Id.
340. Under the amended rules, the SEC's exemption from solicitation allows a
person's status to become the basis for exemption. Almost everyone connected
with the registrant, from associates to officers, cannot rely upon the exemption,
while those that can utilize the exemption consist mostly of "institutional share-
holders, proxy voting advisors and shareholder organizations." Letter from John
F. Olsen, Chair, Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, American Bar Asso-
ciation, to the Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 16, 1992) (on file with
the SEC). The American Bar Association further posits that the correct way to
remedy a structure bias in the proxy rules towards management is to create ex-
emptions based on the information, not the actor. Id.
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formed shareholder suffrage be available for every equity
security bought on a public exchange. 341
F. The Sufficiency and Insufficiency of Other Regulatory
Barriers
Even if an institutional investor can take advantage of the
new exemption from the definition of solicitation and thus es-
cape liability under Rule 14a-9, it is still subject to liability
under section 13d of the Exchange Act and Regulation 13D-G.342
The mere threat of litigation or even filing a 13D under these
sections involves substantial litigation risks. One commentator
notes that "[piroponents are commonly sued by the SEC or the
company's managers for various real or imagined misdis-
closure."343 Due to these risks, actual or perceived, the SEC en-
visioned that this regulation would provide protection to
discourage unreported combinations of institutional investor
voting power and collusive conduct.344
The dangers under this section are twofold. First, under
13D, any group of shareholders that collectively owns more
than five percent of a corporation's voting stock incurs a filing
obligation if they agree to vote in a particular manner.345 Under
Rule 13D, two or more persons form a "group" when they agree
to act together for the purpose of voting securities. An agree-
ment can be proven by circumstantial evidence and parallel
conduct by a group of shareholders. 346 Then, once an agreement
341. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) (stating "[t]he
purpose of the proxy rules is to prevent management or others from obtaining au-
thorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure in
proxy solicitation"); H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934) (acknowl-
edging that "fair corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach to
every security bought on a public exchange").
342. Catherine T. Dixon, The Post Proxy Reform Era: Remaining Pitfalls for
the Unwary Activist Shareholder, CORP. GOVERNANCE ADviSOR, Oct./Nov. 1993, at
12.
343. Bernard S. Black, Beyond Proxy Reform, INSIGHTS, Mar., 1993, at 2, 3.
344. 1992 Final Proxy Amendments, supra note 21, at S-4 n.26.
345. See 15 U.S.C § 78m(d)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1994) (requiring "beneficial
owners" of 5% to file); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a) (1993) (defining beneficial owner).
346. SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 913 (1979). The breadth of this section and managements' utilization of
these rules can be demonstrated by a recent example at General Motors Corpora-
tion (GM). The New York State and Local Retirement Systems and CalPERS inde-
pendently wrote and urged that various candidates be considered by the GM board
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is proven, the group is attributed with beneficial ownership of
all the shares of its members at the time of the agreement and
all members incur a filing obligation.3 7 The rules' broad and
uncertain application presents significant deterrents to risk
averse shareholders who wish to form voting coalitions. 34
Secondly, an institutional investor who is already a 13G
filer 349 incurs another risk when becoming actively involved in
corporate governance. Under 13(d) an owner in excess of five
percent of a corporate security must file a Schedule 13D. How-
ever, certain institutional investors who acquire "in the ordi-
nary course of his business and not for the purpose nor with the
effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer..."
and are required to file under 13(d) may file a Schedule 13G, a
shorter and less frequently filed form. 350 Therefore, if an insti-
and that they be consulted when management formatted new policies. GM
threatened to seek disciplinary action from the SEC. Colleen D. Ball, Comment,
Regulation 14A and 13D: Impediments to Pension Fund Participation in Corporate
Governance, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 175, 180 (citing a telephone interview with Richard
Koppes, general counsel for CalPERS Aug. 16, 1990).
347. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(1) (1993). See Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d
355, 363 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that "the touchstone of a group within the meaning
of section 13(d) is that the members combined in furtherance of a common
objective").
348. One commentator has noted that "[t]o date, neither the Commission nor
its staff has been willing to address in detail the myriad of issues surrounding loss
of Schedule 13G filing status and Section 13(d) group formation generated by
greater institutional involvement in [corporate] governance issues." Dixon, supra
note 342, at 14. For example, a question arises under Rule 13(d) as to what type of
involvement in corporate governance is in the "ordinary course of business" for the
institutional investor. Is this a static or organic concept?
349. There are only specified institutional investors who are permitted to file
a 13G. These institutions are: brokers and dealers registered under section 15 of
the Exchange Act; banks defined in section 3(a)(6) of the Exchange Act; insurance
companies defined in section 3(a)(19) of the Exchange Act; investment companies
registered under section 8 of the Investment Company Act; investment advisors
registered under section 203 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940; and employee
benefit plans or. pension funds subject to the provisions of ERISA. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13d-l(b)(1)(ii) (1993).
350. 17 C.F.R. § 13d-l.[Reg DG](b)(1)(i) (1993). Most institutional investors
file the 13G because under Regulation 13D-G, institutions who in the ordinary
course of business and with a passive intent acquire in excess of five percent of a
security are required to fie either a 13G or a 13D. Id. Since the 13G is the shorter
form and requires less frequent filing, most institutional investors who are re-
quired to file, and allowed to file a 13G, do so. Id. However, due to the trend
towards active investing by institutional investors, the Schedule 13D require-
ments may replace Schedule 13G requirements. Cf Letter from Arthur S. Loring,
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tutional investor's involvement in corporate governance is so ex-
tensive, acting alone or in a group, that their passive
investment intent is deemed to have changed, they will be re-
quired to file a 13G.351 This is a significant risk because their
intent will be judged in hindsight after the violation has taken
place.352 Furthermore, if the institutional investor is deemed a
member of a group with members who do not qualify for or lose
their 13G status, the institutional investor will also lose 13G
filing status, even without an intent to effect control.
Another significant deterrent to an institutional investor
consortium is controlling person liability under the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act. Many sections under these Acts in-
corporate the concept of controlling person liability, such as, de-
termining who is required to file a registration statement, who
is disclosed in a tender offer.353 Under these sections a control-
ling person is subject to civil liability for the companies' securi-
ties violations. 354 Since the courts have applied an expansive
and fact-specific definition of "control persons," this also repre-
sents a major obstacle to concerted institutional activity.355
These deterrents prevent any significant concerted institu-
tional involvement without adequate disclosure to the market
and management, a result consistent with the purpose of the
federal securities laws and the health of the securities mar-
kets.356 If a group holding comprising an excess of fifty percent
Vice President, Fidelity Management & Research Co. to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (Aug. 31, 1992) (on file with the SEC).
351. See C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(b)(1)(i) (1993). Moreover, investors must beware
because if their investment intent changes 10 days prior to the meeting they will
not be able to vote their proxies at that meeting. Id. § 240.13d-l(b)3)(ii).
352. Moreover, a violation of section 13d could cause an investor to lose his
14a-2 exemption, therefore resulting in two causes of action, one under section 13d
and another under section 14a. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(vi) (1993).
353. See generally 4 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 1691-1703 (detailing
all the statutory sections in which control person liability concepts apply under the
federal securities laws).
354. Black, supra note 343, at 4.
355. Id.
356. These were precisely management's fears. As one commentator noted:
"[w]ith large amounts of stock currently held by institutional and other profes-
sional holders, corporate insiders no doubt fear that shareholder voting blocks will
form as a result of "back-room" deal-making and that institutional leverage, al-
ready substantial but often fragmented, will become all but monolithic." Norman
Feit, SEC Proxy Reform: Boon for Free Expression or Back Room Deals? Controver-
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of the market could form agreements as to major corporate di-
rectives, initiatives or issues behind closed doors, without man-
agement or shareholder notice, there would be entirely no need
to utilize many of the amended proxy rules. Taken to an ex-
treme this may well result in a "politicized economy."
Under a "politicized economy" corporate decisions would no
longer be left to the market but rather to the hands of coalitions
of large institutional investors, similar to German and Japa-
nese markets. 357 Accordingly, hastened by a number of markets
competing for capital, our stock market would soon resemble
those in Germany and Japan, highly static, stable market yet
less attractive and deep. 35 8 Moving to convert the U.S. market
in this direction was "flatly rejected" by the Subcommittee on
Corporate Governance and Financial Markets of the Competi-
tiveness Policy Council, a nonpartisan group organized under
President Bush's authority. 359 Section 13(d) is a significant pro-
tection from this danger and should remain in place.360
sial Changes Mean Significant Changes for Public Corporations, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 13,
1992, at 11.
357. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
359. Dan Cordtz, Corporate Hangmen, FIN. WORLD, Mar. 30, 1993, at 24. The
proposed plan of action has come to be known as "relationship investing," which
would only adopt the good aspects of the overseas systems and is seen as a cure for
short term investing. Dobrzynski, supra note 298, at 68; see also Joel Chernoff &
Marlene G. Star, Three Studies Support Relationship Investing, PENSIONS AND IN-
VESTMENTS, Jan. 11, 1993, at 3. But see John Wilcox, Relational Investing: Can it
Really Work?, N.Y. L.J., May 6, 1993, at 5. The result of relationship investing is
that a group of "enlightened investors... give companies patient capital... [and]
free management to focus on the long term. Over time, that should lift profits,
productivity, and prospects. And that would boost U.S. competitiveness."
Dobrzynski, supra note 298, at 68-69. The Council included the following impor-
tant admonition: "[a]s the focus shifts to the performance of the corporations, the
spotlight must also be directed on the management of the activist institutions."
Cordtz, supra, at 26.
360. Various scholars have urged the removal or significant relaxation of sec-
tion 13(d) because of its significant chilling effect on shareholder communication.
See, e.g., Black, supra note 343, at 2; Bernard S. Black, Next Steps in Corporate
Governance Reform: 13(d) Rules and Control Person Liability, in MODERNIZING
U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION: ECONOMICS AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 197 (Kenneth
Lehn & Robert Kamphius eds., 1992); see also Ball, supra note 346, at 201.
Individual investors, often minority investors, receive limited protection from
these sort of activities under other sources of law. For example, under Delaware
state law, minority shareholders are only owed a fiduciary duty by majority share-
holders in a sale of corporate assets or merger transactions. Allied Chem. & Dye
Corp. v. Steel Tube Co. of Am., 120 A. 486, 491 (Del. Ch. 1923). In these transac-
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However, there are other dangers that are not caught in
the Section 13(d) regulatory net. The myriad of solicitations re-
garding shareholder proposals, board nominees, and perform-
ance evaluations by institutional investors will go unregulated.
As one commentator noted, "[a]s a practical matter, in many
cases a shareholder will be able to communicate his or her
views and influence the voting of other shareholders without
triggering or otherwise affecting Schedule 13D or 13G reporting
obligations." 361 Nor do these rules prevent the problems
discussed inter alia pertaining to institutional investors acting
unilaterally in behind-the-scenes negotiations with
management. 362
VI. Conclusion
Corporate management in the United States has been criti-
cized as inefficient and abusive. It has been accused of blocking
takeovers as well as any restraint on its powers, motivated by
the selfish desire to entrench itself in the corporation at the ex-
pense of shareholder interests and the health of the corporation.
Further accusations of management misbehavior include pay-
ing itself high salaries or repurchasing the corporation with cor-
porate funds or power accumulated though the denial of
dividends or at the expense of some other shareholder interest.
Securities laws, in particular the proxy regulations, have their
genesis in efforts to protect the integrity of the market and
tions there is great deference to majority shareholders. In Smith v. Good Music
Station, 129 A.2d 242, 247 (Del. Ch. 1957), the Delaware Chancery Court con-
cluded "that even though a director-officer who owned half the corporation's stock
received a lucrative side contract, he would still be 'somewhat restrained from
.short-changing" himself' as a stockholder in negotiating an asset sale." 2 ERNEST
L. FOLK III ET AL., FOLK ON DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATE LAw § 271.6.2.3 (2d
ed. 1990) (quoting Good Music Station, 129 A.2d 242, 247 (Del. Ch. 1957)). Minor-
ities are also entitled to an appraisal but that is only available to stockholders
forced from their equity positions in certain mergers and consolidations. See J. E.
Calio, New Appraisals of Old Problems, Reflections on Delaware Appraisal Pro-
ceedings, 34 Am. Bus. L.J. 1 (1994) (criticizing the efficacy of this remedy). There-
fore, unless removed from their ownership interests as the result of a proxy contest
or election is this remedy effective. A minority shareholder could also file a deriva-
tive suit to enjoin the action, however, these suits are cost prohibitive and present
procedural difficulties.
361. Robert Lang & David Lefkowitz, The Shareholder Communications
Rules-Implications for Shareholders and Management, INSIGHTS, Dec. 1992, at 3.
362. See supra part V.C.
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shareholder interests from these problems. Management's posi-
tion projects itself as an easy target for criticism and suspicion,
through its power as the day-to-day operator of the corporation,
and as the architect of corporate policy, with its superior infor-
mation about the corporation and access to corporate funds.
This imbalance of power and potential for abuse has
prompted the law to develop safeguards to prevent manage-
ment overreaching. Various duties and obligations are set forth
by both state and federal law. Our system of corporate govern-
ance provides that directors monitor management. Sharehold-
ers can affect corporate decisions through their exercise of voter
suffrage under the proxy system. These precautions are war-
ranted. The imbalance of power between management and
shareholders, however, is necessary to allow management the
flexibility to effectively operate the corporation; the importance
of the investment capital that management is assigned to pro-
tect necessitates a regime that regulates management conduct.
A controlling shareholder, such as a group of institutional
investors, can be as equally offensive and incompetent to a free
and informed market as management. A controlling share-
holder can influence decisions to increase its equity in a merger
at the expense of others. It can also utilize the corporation's
assets to further its own means. Through its influence a con-
trolling shareholder can compel the corporation to buy its own
goods or stock or provide services below competitive market
prices. Furthermore, it can influence the corporation to engage
in transactions that dilute the value of the corporation but not
its own interests, as can result in "greenmail." Significantly, a
controlling shareholder can be as equally, if not more, inept as
management in operating a corporation. In essence, it can use
the corporation's assets to fulfill its own needs, which often may
not coincide with other investors' needs, particularly those of an
individual investor.
The main distinction between management and a control-
ling shareholder is that the law provides many constraints on
management's actions. The same can not now be said for the
controlling shareholder, especially if 13D is enforced leniently
or removed completely from the regulatory scheme as some
have argued should be done. The law extends no duties or obli-
gations between the controlling shareholder and other share-
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holders. Quite simply, the controlling shareholder has all the
power and potential for abuse we fear in management and none
of the accountability.
Often in the amendments the SEC delegates its regulatory
power to the free and open discourse that may be the result of
its new and less restrictive proxy regulations. However, this
power has been delegated to the parties involved in the transac-
tions. The SEC believes, perhaps erroneously, that a party to a
transaction can or will assume its role as neutral umpire. The
SEC's final revisions of the proxy regulation may have achieved
a laudatory goal in repairing the proxy machinery. Many of the
enacted proposals will increase the ability of shareholders to en-
gage in free and open discourse to the benefit of corporate
health. The regulations have arguably taken away many im-
pediments to participation by shareholders in corporate govern-
ance through the proxy process. At the same time, they have
also removed the only significant impediment to market manip-
ulation by controlling shareholders. The amendments are vir-
tually silent in regard to protection from this unwanted
possibility. The SEC's Commentary in support and explanation
of the amendments simply dismisses the potential problems
without addressing them and did not foresee the "back-room"
lobbying that has occurred between management and institu-
tional investors. Originally, not even the critics of the amend-
ments foresaw this development, instead warning of secret
collusion among investors. However, more alarming and in di-
rect contrast to the laudatory intentions of the amendments is
this new activity which amounts to circumvention of the proxy
system and individual investor suffrage by management and
the institutional investor.
The SEC has the affirmative obligation to ensure that mar-
ket integrity is never compromised with the taint of inaccurate
or fraudulent information. At the same time a stagnant market
in which the participants are silenced into compliance with the
status quo is equally undesirable and contrary to the ideals the
Commission is obligated to protect. In efforts to remedy the lat-
ter the Commission may have failed in the prevention of the
former.
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